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INTRODUCTION

A

rticle 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code ("UCC"), the state
law establishing and defining the secured credit system in
personal property,1 has undergone a massive revision.2 This com
plicated,3 collaborative,4 arduous, 5 and at times contentious,6 process

1

Article 9, originally enacted over forty years ago, has been the subject ofa massive
revision project, undertaken over the past ten years by the Permanent Editorial Board for
the UCC ("PEB"), the American Law Institute ("ALI"), and the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (''NCCUSL"). Article 9's revision process is
complete, and the revised statute has been enacted into law in all 50 states and the
District of Columbia. NCCUSL, Introductions & Adoptions of Uniform Acts (2002),
available at http://www.nccusl.orgfUpdate/uniformact_factsheets/uniformacts-fsucca9
.asp. As stated in the Official Comment to Section 9-101:
In 1990, the Permanent Editorial Board for the UCC ... established a
committee to study Article 9 of the UCC. The study committee issued its report
as of December 1, 1992, recommending the creation of a drafting committee
for the revision of Article 9 and also recommending numerous specific changes
to Article 9. Organized in 1993, a drafting committee met fifteen times from
1993 to 1998. This Article was approved by its sponsors in 1998.
U.C.C. § 9-101 cmt. 2 (2001); see also PERMANENT EDITORIAL BOARD FOR THE UNIFORM
COMMERC!ACCODE, PEB STUDY GROUP u.c.c. ARTICLE 9 REPORT (1992) [hereinafter
PEB STUDY].
2
The new Article 9 contains 126 sections. Thirty-six of these sections are
completely new and seventy-one sections have language that was not included in former
Article 9. "ln terms of how the law is expressed, it would be more accurate to label ...
Article 9 as 'new' rather than 'revised.,,, JULIAN B. McDONNELL, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL
CODE: ANALYSIS OF REVISED ARTICLE 9, 1 (1999).
3
The goal of simplicity was arguably not met by the drafters of Revised Article 9. In
many places its language is highly ambiguous. Although no citation beyond the language
of Revised Article 9 is necessary, see Jean Wegman Bums, New Article 9 of the UCC:
The Good, The Bad, and the Ugly, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 29 (2002). The author refers
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redefined the contours of the relationship between secured creditors,
unsecured creditors, and debtors. 7 Under Revised Article 9, secured
creditors are granted greater rights than they had under forrner 8 Article 9
in myriad obvious and not-so-obvious ways. We now have a secured
credit system whereby secured creditors can more easily encumber a

her "journey through new Article 9 [as] a descent into a new tenth ring of Dante's
Hell .... " Id. at n.11. She makes the following observations:
[A)lmost every tree in the forest has been renumbered and moved; many old
trees have been split into two or three smaller bushes, which the user must
cross-reference to get a complete and accurate answer; there are few signposts
to help one find the paths through the newly arranged forest; there are land
mines throughout the forest, i.e., small, but significant, changes in the rules that
only a careful reading will uncover; there are a fair number of new trees in the
forest and some whole new groves of trees; while some of the changes bring
major improvements to Article 9, others are counterintuitive or add entirely
new areas of confusion; some sections of the new Article 9 are written in a
language other than English and can only be understood if one has a preexisting
knowledge of the law; and despite alt the new trees and pruned old trees, a
substantial number of questions ... remain unanswered by the new Article 9.
Id. at 33-34.
4
PEB STUDY, supra note 1, at 2-3 (describing the various parties participating in the
revisions process).
5
In contrast to former Article 9, which includes five parts and fifty-five subsections,
Revised Article 9 has six parts and 126 subsections (not including the transitional rules
and conforming amendments). U.C.C. §§ 9-101to9--628 (2001).
6
Steven L. Harris & Charles W. Mooney, Jr., Reflections of the Reporters, 74 Cm.
KENT L. REv. 1357, 1364 (1999) [hereinafter Reflections] (referring to the "level of
dyspepsia ... generated" by a discussion of an issue in connection with the revision);
Edward J. Janger, Predicting When the Uniform Law Process Will Fail: Article 9,
Capture and the Race to the Bottom, 83 IOWA L. REV. 569, 573-76 (1998) (describing the
tension in the Article 9 drafting process in reconciling the central reform objectives
simplicity and the third-party effects of secured credit); Robert E. Scott, The Politics of
Article 9, 80 VA. L. REv. 1783, 1784 (1994) (observing that the Article 9 revision debate
concerned the "efficiency and social value of Article 9").
7
Interestingly, the Co-Reporters for the drafting committee described Revised
Article 9 as follows: "Revised Article 9 most assuredly does not embody a material
alteration of the basic attributes of secured transactions law. As we explain more fully
below, the revision clarifies, tinkers at the edges, refines, and generally seeks to make the
statute more user friendly and more precise." (footnotes omitted). Steven L. Harris &
Charles W. Mooney, Jr., Revised Article 9 Meets the Bankruptcy Code: Policy and
Impact, 9 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 85, 92 (2001) [hereinafter Policy & Impact].
8
The process of drafting a uniform code governing secured credit transactions
originally began in 1946. By 1950, the basic construct of Article 9 was completed. Seel
GRANT GILMORE, SECURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY 288, 289 n.l (1965).
Article 9 was substantially revised in 1962 and 1972. PEB FINAL REPORT (April 25,
1991) (proposal for changes in Article 9 of UCC). Louisiana was the last hold-out state,
finally adopting the 1972 version of Article 9 of the UCC in 1988. Act No. 528, 1988 La.
Acts 1367-422, effective Jan. 1, 1990, (codified at LA. REV. STAT. ANN.§§ 10:9-101 to
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greater number of particular types of debtors' assets 9 and can more
readily securitize more types of assets with greater certainty. 10
The revision was justified largely on grounds of efficiency. 11 It was
argued that if secured creditors' reach is broader and transaction costs are
lower, secured credit will be more widely available at a reduced cost. 12
Therefore, secured !ending's efficiency will increase, meaning that the
benefits that flow to some affected parties will outweigh the detriment to
others.1 3
This theoretical justification for Article 9's revision echoes the
earliest explanation for the secured credit system offered by its original
proponents. 14 These scholars posited various theories in an attempt to
explain why the gains from secured credit were greater than the
corresponding costs. 15 These explanations were ultimately inconclusive,
and to date the efficiency of secured credit remains unproven. 16 The
absence of a proven justification for secured credit, however, did not
hinder the use of economic efficiency as an initial argument favoring its
.
d use an d expansion.
. 17
contmue
An alternative theoretical perspective on the secured credit system
that has gained momentum in the years during Article 9's revision states
that in some credit markets, under certain circumstances, the gains that
flow to secured creditors are had at the expense of unsecured creditors,
who, as a practical matter, are unable to adjust to the risks presented by
secured credit. 18 These creditors, including tort creditors, trade creditors,
9

Professor Barry Zaretsky referred to the Article 9 revision as a "love feast for
secured creditors." McDONNELL, supra note 2, at 2.
lO Indeed, in the words of the Reporters for the Drafting Committee, "[m]any of
[Revised Article 9's] provisions make it easier and less expensive to create and perfect
security interests and to achieve priority over competing claimants." Harris & Mooney,
Reflections, supra note 6, at 1360; see also G. Ray Warner, The Anti-Bankruptcy Act:
Revised Article 9 and Bankruptcy, 9 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 3 (2001).
11
Harris & Mooney, Reflections, supra note 6, at 1360.
12
Id. at 1359-61.
13
This is known as Kaldor-Hicks efficiency. To be considered Kaldor-Hicks
efficient, the gains to one party may not exceed the losses to another. RICHARD A.
POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 13-16 (4th ed. 1992).
14
Thomas H. Jackson & Anthony T. Kronman, Secured Financing and Priorities
Among Creditors, 88 YALE L.J. 1143 (1979); James J. White, Efficiency Justifications for
Personal Property Security, 37 V AND. L. REv. 473 (1984).
15
Jackson & Kronman, supra note 14, at 1158; White, supra note 14, at 503.
16
Alan Schwartz, Security Interests and Bankruptcy Priorities: A Review of Current
Theories, 10 J. LEGAL STUD. I, 37 (1981).
17
Harris & Mooney, Reflections, supra note 6, at 1360.
18
Lynn M. LoPucki, The Unsecured Creditor's Bargain, 80 VA. L. REv. 1887,
1896-98, (1994) [hereinafter Creditor's Bargain].
Article 9 artificially and unjustifiably advantages the institution of security over
unsecurity. It holds involuntary unsecured creditors to an entirely
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employees, and taxing authorities, are undiversified in their "credit"
extensions and are less able to weather losses that result from a debtor's
secured credit arrangements. 19 According to the theory, the externali
zation of the risk of non-payment to these parties misallocates resources
and potentially encourages the excessive use of security. 20
Scholars have further argued that not only has the efficiency of
secured credit not been proven, but the discussion concerning the
wisdom of Article 9's changes ought not begin and end with the issue of
efficiency. 21 These scholars have posited that economic analysis offers a
limited perspective on the policy choice of continually expanding
secured credit.22
Clearly, the theoretical scholarship is divided on the expected impact
of Revised Article 9. 23 Neither elaborate economic and financial
models 24 nor detailed predictive descriptions of the impact of Revised

bargain. It holds voluntary unsecured creditors to the terms of security
agreements to which they did not in fact agree and to which they did not have
access. The terms of those agreements are binding regardless of how
unreasonable they may be. This bizarre scheme subsidizes the institution of
security, causing more secured lending than is optimal.
Id. at I 963; see also Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Jesse M. Fried, The Uneasy Case for the
Priority ofSecured Claims in Bankruptcy, 105 YALE L.J. 857, 872-79 (1996).
19
Barry E. Adler, Finance's Theoretical Divide and the Proper Role of Insolvency
Rules, 67 S. CAL. L. REV. 1107 n.35 (1994) [hereinafter Finance's Divide] (describing
undiversified creditors as those who extend credit to a limited number of debtors or to
debtors in limited business sectors).
20
Bebchuk & fried, supra note 18, at 872-79. See generally C. Scott Pryor, How
Revised Article 9 Will Turn the Trnstee 's Strong-Arm Into a Weak Finger: A Potpourri of
Cases, 9 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 229 (2001); Warner, supra note 10 (observing that
blanket liens may now cover deposit accounts, health-care insurance receivables, and
commercial tort claims).
21
See Elizabeth Warren, Making Policy with Imperfect Information: The Article 9
Full Priority Debates, 82 CORNELL L. REv. 1373, 1386--87 (1997) [hereinafter Imperfect
Information].
22
Id. at 1385-88.
23
Robert E. Scott, The Truth About Secured Financing, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 1436,
1437 (1997).
Put simply, we still do not have a theory of finance that explains why
firms sometimes (but not always) issue secured debt rather than unsecured debt
or equity. Moreover (and perhaps because of the lack of any plausible general
theory), we lack any persuasive empirical data to predict whether, in any
particular case, a later security-financed project will generate sufficient returns
to offset any reduction in the value (i.e., the bankruptcy share) of prior
unsecured claims.
Id. at 1436.
24
See, e.g., David Gray Carlson, Secured Credit as a Zero Sum Game, 19 CARDOZO
L. REV. 1635 (1998).
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Article 9 have proven the actual, societal effects of the statute. 25 As has
historically been the case in other contexts, the theoretical appraisal of
the commercial credit system has predated empiricism.26
It must be recognized, however, that theory and· empiricism are
mutually dependent; a central role of theory is to channel research, and
empiricism is employed to prove or disprove a particular theory or set of
theories.2 7 When the results of empirical research corroborate a particular
theory, the theory gains independent validity. 28 Conversely, theories that
empirical studies consistently fail to substantiate will be, and ought to be,
abandoned. 29 Theoretical thinking on Article 9 is sufficiently advanced
so that data can be used to test developed hypotheses-.meaning specific
statements of prediction-against their corollaries. 30 A causal study will
have as its focus the effects of a cause (the revision of Article 9) on one
or more outcomes (impacts on and behaviors of participants in the credit
markets).
25

See, e.g., Warner, supra note 10, at 3-9; Harris & Mooney, Policy & Impact,
supra note 7, at 85-96.
26
This type of inquiry has been referred to as the "land of theory" (as compared to
the "land of observation").
The land of theory is what goes on inside your mind, and your attempt to
explain or articulate this to others. It is all of the ideas, theories, hunches and
hypotheses that you have about the world. In the land of theory you will find
your idea of the program or treatment as it should be. You will find the idea or
construct of the outcomes or measures that you believe you are trying to affect.
William M. Trochim, Idea of Construct Validity, available at http://www.socialresearch
methods.net/kb/considea.htm (last visited Mar. 14, 2005).
27
JOHN M. NEALE & ROBERT M. LIEBERT, SCIENCE AND BEHAVIOR: AN
INTRODUCTION TO THE METHODS OF RESEARCH (3d ed. 1986).
Empirical research, the foundation of the scientific approach, refers to any
activity that systematically attempts to gather evidence through observations
and procedures that can be repeated and verified by others. The scientific
approach requires that all claims be exposed to systematic probes. Statements,
theories, and assertions, regardless of how plausible they seem, must be
testable.
Id. at 7.
28
Id. at 13.
29 Id.
30
Two mutually exclusive hypotheses must be identified that together exhaust all
possible outcomes. The testing must be conducted so that one hypothesis is proven and
one is rejected. This is known as the hypothetical deductive model of research-working
from the more general to the more specific. See William M. Trochim, Deductive and
Inductive Thinking, available at http://www.socialresearchmethods.net/kb/dedind.htm
(last visited Mar. 14, 2005). "We might begin with thinking up a theory about our topic
of interest. We then narrow down into more specific hypotheses that we can test. We
narrow down even further when we collect observations to address the hypotheses with
specific date--a confirmation (or not) or our original theories." Id. See infra notes 246
58 and accompanying text for a detailed account of the empirical study's proposed
research protocol.
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In this article, I outline a research protocol for the study of Revised
Article 9. 31 Part II sets forth a detailed account of the most significant
changes made to Article 9. These changes are both substantive and pro
cedural. Part III describes the competing theories justifying the existence
and expansion of Article 9. I discuss, in concrete terms, the variety of
predictions made concerning the effects of the Article 9 revisions on
debtors and creditors where the debtor is not in bankruptcy. Since the
vast majority of secured loans (and even distressed secured loans) are not
administered within the bankruptcy process, this is an important context
in which to examine the statutory changes. Part IV illustrates the
importance of empiricism and describes recent empirical studies in
commercial law. Part V discusses business bankruptcy theory and the
intersection between theoretical perspectives on bankruptcy and Article
9. Part VI outlines a research protocol for the initial study of Article 9's
impact on the credit markets. This part defines specific questions to be
addressed, the methodology for addressing them, and the procedures to
be followed. Part VII outlines a research protocol for the study of Article
9's impact when a debtor is in bankruptcy. Part VIII concludes by noting
the importance of gaining sufficient empirical information in order to
resolve the theoretical debate concerning the impact of Revised Article 9.

II. REVISED ARTICLE 9

A. Secured Credit-Related Changes
At the outset of the Article 9 revision process there was a definitive
theoretical divide, not only concerning the wisdom of further expanding
the statute's scope, but also concerning the fundamental issue of whether
there ought to be some limit on the debtor's ability to pledge all of its
assets. 32 Accordingly, the open question on the minds of those watching
31

This article discusses Revised Article 9 in the context of the business (non
consumer) borrower. There are distinct and definite differences between the consumer
finance market and the commercial finance market. A discussion of the consumer finance
market is beyond the scope of this article.
32
Steven L. Harris & Charles W. Mooney, A Property-Based Theory of Security
Interests: Taking Debtors' Choices Seriously, 80 VA. L. REV. 2021, 2051-53 (1994)
[hereinafter A Property-Based Theory].
It seems enough that security interests, under Article 9 and real estate law
alike, are interests in property. The legal regime for security interest reflects
property law functionally as well as doctrinally. We believe it follows that the
law should honor the transfer or retention of security interests on the same
normative grounds on which it respects the alienation of property generally.
Id. But see 1 GILMORE, supra note 8, at 248-49:
Considerations of policy and common sense suggest that there must be a
limiting point somewhere. Borrowers should not be encouraged or allowed
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and waiting for the new Article 9 was how equilibrium would be struck
between the interests of those most and least able to diversify the risk of
a debtor's financial distress. 33 More specifically, how would the law
defining, allocating, and distributing property entitlements between
secured and unsecured creditors be balanced so that the interests of all
affected parties are duly recognized?
While the drafters claim to have struck a fair balance between
secured and unsecured creditors, on its face Article 9 departs consider
ably from the former law governing secured transactions. 34 There is the
hypothecate all that they may ever own in the indefinite future in favor of a
creditor who is willing to make the loan now .... And ways should be found to
penalize a lender, who, after allowing his borrower to pile up an intolerable
weight of debt, then claims all the assets of the insolvent estate, leaving nothing
to satisfy other claims.
Id. See also William J. Woodward, The Realist and Secured Credit: Grant Gilmore,
Common-Law Courts, and the Article 9 Reform Process, 82 CORNELL L. REv. 1511
(1997).
33
This· has also been one of the central issues of dissension in connection with the
recent efforts to revise the Bankruptcy Code. Unfortunately, the efforts on the part of
those advocating for reforms are designed to tip the balance of power in favor of those
most able to spread the risk of financial losses. See Philip Shenon, Hard Lobbying on
Debtor Bill Pays Dividend, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 13, 2001, at Al (describing efforts by the
National Consumer Bankruptcy Coalition, a powerful lobbying group formed by
members of the consumer credit industry, to push a major, creditor-friendly Bankruptcy
Code overhaul through Congress). The success rate for three- to five-year Repayment
plans is less than 30%. Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of
2005, available at http://www.law.unlv.edu/faculty/rlawless/5256-passed-senate.pdf. (last
visited Apr. 1, 2005).
34
It was noted that the Drafting Committee "sought balance [between secured and
unsecured creditors] at every turn." Harris & Mooney, Reflections, supra note 6, at 1363
64. An example of the balance sought (and purportedly achieved) includes the Drafting
Committee's failure to disrupt the ability of the bankruptcy trustee to avoid an
unperfected security interest. Reporters for the Drafting Committee observed that "[t]he
appropriate relationship between secured and unsecured creditors may present the single
most important cluster of issues ...." Id. at 1358-59; see also Steven L. Harris &
Charles W. Mooney, Jr., The Article 9 Study Committee Report: Strong Signals and Hard
Choices, 29 IDAHO L. REv. 561, 569 (1993). The PEB Commentary contained the
following explanation of its mission:
[One could ask] ... whether Article 9 should limit the types of property that
can be subjected to a security interest or the extent to which a debtor's property
can be so encumbered. Or one might question whether any perfection step
should be necessary to obtain priority over judicial lien creditors or other
competing claimants. Or one might question whether security interests ought to
be enforceable at all.
Although it is well aware of challenges to the validity of some basic
principles that underlie Article 9, the Committee chose not to undertake a
thorough reexamination of those principles. Nor did the Committee's
deliberations reflect strong support for making major adjustments in the
balance that Article 9 now strikes between secured parties and unsecured
creditors. But insofar as the Committee's recommendations would make it
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potential for secured creditors more easily to dominate a debtor's assets,
and thus the debtor's business, to the exclusion of other creditors'
interests. New collateral categories have been added, the concept of
"proceeds" has been augmented, and certain formerly non-assignable
rights are now assignable as security.
1. New Article 9 Assets
A number of new categories of collateral have been added to the
Revised Article 9. These include health-care insurance receivables, 35
commercial tort clairns,36 payment intangibles,37 and deposit accounts. 38
Each of these is discussed below.
a. Health-care Insurance Receivables
"Health-care insurance receivables" are listed as a new variety of
"account."39 Interests or claims that arise under health insurance policies
or health-care insurance receivables are new Article 9 collateral,40 except
to the extent that Article 9 is preempted by "a statute, regulation or treaty
of the United States ... .'"' 1 Federal law provides such a stumbling block
by prohibiting the assignment of federal government-sponsored health

easier and less costly to take and perfect security interests, they are likely to
have the effect of improving the position of secured parties relative to that of
unsecured creditors. . . . The Committee believes that any necessary
adjustments for the protection of third parties should be made directly, as by
changing Article 9's priority rules or by modifying the avoidance powers or
other distributional rules of the Bankruptcy Code, and not indirectly, as by
increasing the difficulty and expense of creating perfected security interests.
PEB STUDY, supra note l, at 8-9 (footnotes omitted); see also James J. White, Work and
Play in Revising Article 9, 80 VA. L REv. 2089, 2089 ( 1994) (declaring the efficiency of
Article 9 irrelevant to the revision process).
35
U.C.C. §§ 9-102(a)(2) & 9-102(a)(46) (2001).
36
§ 9-102(a)(13).
37
§ 9-102(a)(61).
38
§ 9-102(a)(29).
39
One of the historical problems with using health--care insurance receivables as
collateral was old Article 9's exclusion of insurance proceeds from Article 9 coverage.
See former U.C.C. § 9-104(g) (1998) ("This article does not apply ... (g) to a transfer of
an interest in or claim in or under any policy of insurance, except as provided with
respect to proceeds (Section 9-306) and priorities in proceeds (Section 9-312). ").
40
A health--care insurance receivable is defined as "an interest in or claim under a
policy of insurance which is a right to payment of a monetary obligation for health--care
goods or services provided .... " U.C.C. § 9-102(46) (2001). Assignments to health
care providers (i.e., doctors and hospitals) are automatically perfected. See U.C.C. § 9309(5) (2002).
41
§
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insurance receivables. 42 Revised Article 9 avoids this problem by
separating attachment and perfection of security interests from those
Article 9 remedies that allow direct collection from account debtors. 43
Specifically, section 9-408 invalidates restrictions on assignments that
impair the creation and perfection of security interests in health-care
receivables. 44 This invalidation neither empowers the secured party to
enforce the security interest nor imposes any duties on the secured
party.45 It does, however, allow the debtor to obtain additional credit and
permits the secured party to attach the proceeds of the health-care
receivable in the event of default. 46
As a result of this revision, both federal and private health-care
insurance receivables can now be used as collateral in much the same
way as other rights to payment.

b. Commercial Tort Claims
· The prohibition against the use of commercial tort claims as
collateral has also been lifted. Revised section 9-102(a)(13) defines
commercial tort claims as those claims that arise in tort in the course of a
claimant's business. 47 The Article 9 Drafting Committee, considering the
42

Federal health insurance programs, such as Medicare and Medicaid, currently
include provisions that prevent their assignment, and state law (meaning Article 9) cannot
preempt federal law provisions. See Social Security Amendments of 1972 (codified at 42
U.S.C. § 1395g(c) (1994) and 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(32) (1994)) and the Medicare
Medicaid Anti-fraud and Abuse Amendments to the Social Security Act (codified at 42
U.S.C. § 1395g(c) (1994)). Federal government sponsored health-care programs (i.e.,
Medicare and Medicaid) do not allow payments to be made to any person other than the
health-care provider. Pursuant to a letter from the Acting Director of the Health Care
Finance Agency, when the transaction involves the sale of Medicare or Medicaid
receivables, payments may be made directly to the provider and then transferred to a
special account that may then be accessed by the lender. Letter from Kathleen Buto,
Acting Director of the HCF A Bureau of Eligibility, Reimbursement and Coverage, Sept.
15, 1988, quoted in Patrick A. Guida, 1999 Financing Health Care Providers, SD71
A.L.1.-A.B.A. 401, 421 (1999).
43
Section 9-408 renders such contractual terms ineffective only to the extent that
they "would impair the creation, attachment or perfection of a security interest." U.C.C.
§ 9-408(a)(I) & (c)(l) (2001).
44
Id.
45
Note also that§ 9-408(d) relieves the health-care receivable account debtor from
virtually every obligation to the secured creditor. "By making available previously
unavailable property as collateral, this section should enable debtors to obtain additional
credit." Id. at cmt. 8.
46 Jd.
47
U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(13) (2001). Section 9-109(d)(12) explicitly states that non
commercial tort claims are not included within the scope of Revised Article 9. See § 9408 cmt. 8. ("By making available previously unavailable property as collateral, this
section should enable debtors to obtain additional credit.").
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fact that many jurisdictions allow the assignment of tort claims that arise
from a breach of contract, "[saw] little reason to continue the general
exclusion of tort claims that are otherwise assignable under non-UCC
law.''48
Under the Revised UCC there are some limits placed on the use of
commercial tort claims as collateral. Commercial claims must exist at the
time of the original agreement, meaning after-acquired tort claims
cannot be taken as collateral.49 Moreover, the commercial tort claim must
be described with some specificity in the security agreement-"all
commercial tort claims of the debtor" will not do. 50
c. Payment Intangibles

"Payment intangibles," defined as "general intangible[s] under which
the account debtor's principal obligation is a monetary obligation," are a
new type of Article 9 collateral. 51 Receivables that are not "chattel
paper," "instruments," or "accounts" (because they do not arise out of
property that has been or is to be sold, leased, licensed, assigned, or
otherwise disposed of) are "general intangibles" for the payment of
money-"payment intangibles.''52
The classic example of "payment intangibles" is payment streams
from the sale of loan pool participations, typically originated by financial
48

PEB STUDY, supra note 1, at 59. There is a specific exclusion for tort claims that
arise out of personal injury or death.§ 9-102(a)(l3)(B)(ii). This is thought to be traceable
to prohibitions against champerty and maintenance. See PEB STUDY, supra note 1, at 58
nn.2-3 (citing BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 231 (6th ed. 1990) (defining "champerty'' as a
"bargain between a stranger and a party to a lawsuit by which the stranger pursues the
party's claim in consideration of receiving part of any judgment proceeds" and
"maintenance" as "maintaining, supporting or assisting, the litigation of another.")).
49
§ 9-109 cmt. 15.
so § 9-102(a)(l3). A creditor, however, can include a categorical description of
"commercial tort claims" (and all types of collateral) in the financing statement. § 9
502(a)(3).
51
§ 9-102(61).
52
Id. Comment 5(d) notes that "payment intangibles" are a subset of "general
intangibles." "Virtually any intangible right could give rise to a right to payment of
money once one hypothesizes, for example, that the account debtor is in breach of its
obligation. The term 'payment intangible,' however, embraces only those general
intangibles 'under which the account debtor's principal obligation is a monetary
obligation."' Id. at cmt. 5(d). General intangibles are a residual category of "personal
property'' under Revised Article 9. Section 9-102(42) states that "any personal property,
including things in action, other than accounts, chattel paper, commercial tort claims,
deposit accounts, documents, goods, instruments, investment property, letter-of-credit
rights, letters of credit, money, and oil, gas or other minerals before extraction" are
general intangibles. Examples cited in the Official Comment include "intellectual
property and the right to payment of a loan of funds that is not evidenced by chattel paper
or an instrument." Id.; see also§ 9-102(a)(2), (11), (42), (47), & (61).
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institutions. 53 The transfer of these loan pool participations was not
governed by former Article 9 and, accordingly, buyers of fractional
interests of commercial loans have not customarily filed financing
statements to perfect their interests. In the course of the Article 9 revision
process, parties to loan pool participation transactions expressed the
potentially conflicting desire of wanting the benefits of increased
certainty and decreased risk provided by Article 9 perfection, but without
the burden of required public filing. In response, the drafters provided for
automatic perfection of payment intangibles. 54
d. Deposit Accounts

Article 9 now provides that businesses' deposit accounts may be
encumbered as original collateral.ss Deposit accounts are defined to
include demand, time savings, or passbook accounts maintained with a
bank. 56 Prior to the widespread adoption of Revised Article 9, a number
of states enacted non-uniform amendments that included deposit

53

Some courts have held, however, that sales of loan participations characterized by
the parties as "sales" are in fact disguised security transactions. See, e.g., Jn re Coronet
Capital Co., 142 B.R. 78, 80 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1992) (discussing factors indicative ofa
disguised security transaction). Sales of payment intangibles as collateral are
automatically perfected, whereas transfers of payment intangibles as collateral are not.
Harris & Mooney, Reflections, supra note 6, at 1371-72; see also Paul M. Shupack,
Making Revised Article 9 Safe for Securitizations: A Brief History, 73 AM. BANKR. L.J.
167, 170 (1999) (noting that, under former Article 9, the cash flows from the sale of loan
pools are deemed to be general intangibles, thus their sale is not governed by Article 9);
U.C.C. § 9-309(3) (2001) ("The following security interests are perfected when they
attach ... (3) a sale of a payment intangible ....").
54
See Shupack, supra note 53, at 179. With automatic perfection of a transfer of
payment intangibles, secured parties run the risk that searchers of the public records will
not discover the prior interest in their assets. Article 9 similarly allows for automatic
perfection of the sale of promissory notes. Under Revised Article 9, a transfer of a
promissory note as collateral for a loan may, however, be perfected by filing. U.C.C.
§§ 9-3 lO(a), 9-312(a) (2001). The definition of"promissory note" is new and, according
to the Official Comment, was "necessitated by the inclusion of sales of promissory notes
within the scope of Article 9." § 9-102 cmt. 5(d). The definition reads:
"Promissory note" means an instrument that evidences a promise to pay a
monetary obligation, does not evidence an order to pay, and does not contain an
acknowledgment by a bank that the bank has received for deposit a sum of
money or funds.
§ 9-102(a)(65).
55
Article 9 does not explicitly list deposit accounts as eligible original Article 9
collateral, but expansively states that all personal property is included within its scope,
except for that property that is explicitly excluded. § 9-109(a)(l). Section 9-109(d)(13)
explicitly states that Article 9 does not apply to assignments of deposit accounts in
consumer transactions. § 9-109(d)(l 3).
56
§ 9-102(a)(29).
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accounts in their versions of former Article 9. 57 In other states, common
law provided a process for taking security interests in deposit accounts. 58
In order to further the goal of uniformity, the Revised Article 9 drafters
included commercial deposit accounts as a new type of eligible
collateral. 59
The perfection provisions for deposit accounts outline separate rules
for when i) the party seeking to encumber the deposit account is the bank
in which the account is held, and ii) the party seeking to encumber the
account is a third party. 60 "Control" (and thus perfection) is automatic if
the bank in which the account is held is the secured party. 61 Other
secured creditors can obtain "control" (and thus perfection) by getting
either an "authenticated"62 agreement from both the bank and the debtor,

57

See, e.g., CAL. COM. CODE§§ 4210 & 9104 (1992); HAW. REV. STAT.§ 490:9-104
(1992); ILL. COMP. STAT. 26/9-104 (West 1992); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 10:9-104 (West
1992); IDAHO CODE § 28-9-306 (Michie 1992).
58
See, e.g., First Tenn. Bank Nat'l Ass'n v. Resolution Trust Corp. (In re
Creekstone Apts. Assocs. ), 165 B.R. 851, 854 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1994).
59
Bruce A. Markell, From Property to Contract and Back: An Examination of
Deposit Accounts and Revised Article 9, 74 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 963, 973 (1999). The
author notes that, in recent years, credit and depository institutions have increasingly
been engaged in interstate business. As such, the non-uniformity among the states under
former Article 9 became more onerous. Under some states' non-uniform versions of
former Article 9, creditors could take a security interest in deposit accounts as original
collateral. Id.
60
Perfection of original security interests in deposit accounts is not achieved by
filing, but by the newly defined perfection concept of gaining "control." According to the
Official Comment to section 9-104, "'control ... pursuant to the debtor's agreement'
may substitute for an authenticated security agreement as an element of attachment."
U.C.C. § 9-104 cmt. 2 (2001).
61
"Control" is defined in section 9-104. The definition reads:
A secured party has control of a deposit account if:
(1) the secured party is the bank with which the deposit account is
maintained;
(2) the debtor, secured party, and bank have agreed in an
authenticated record that the bank will comply with instructions originated
by the secured party directing disposition of the funds in the deposit
account without further consent by the debtor; or
(3) the secured party becomes the bank's customer with respect to the
deposit account.
§ 9-104(a) (2001).
62
The UCC defines "authenticate" as:
(A) to sign; or
(B) to execute or otherwise adopt a symbol, or encrypt or
similarly process a record in whole or in part, with the present intent
of the authenticating person to identify the person and adopt or
accept a record.
§ 9-102(a)(7).
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granting the creditor access and rights to the account, or becoming a
customer of the bank in which the account is held. 63
2. Relaxation ofAsset Transfer Restrictions

In addition to adding new types of collateral, Revised Article 9
relaxes many statutory and contractual restrictions on the transfer of
certain assets. 64 Reflecting Revised Article 9's strong policy in favor of
free assignability, these provisions have the effect of overriding most
restrictions on the assignment of accounts, general intangibles, promis
sory notes, and other contract and intangible property interests.65
Although this is not a pure "scope" provision, the anti-assignment rules
facilitate the creation of a valid, perfected Article 9 security interest in a
broader variety of a debtor's assets. 66
3. Expansion ofProceeds Definition

The new definition of "proceeds" is another major change to Article
9's scope. 67 Section 9-102(a)(64) defines "proceeds" as "whatever is
acquired upon the sale, lease, license, exchange, or other disposition of
collateral" and "rights arising out of collateral.''68 This newly crafted
description of proceeds is designed to capture any property with a
connection to the original collateral as proceeds.69 It eliminates the
requirement that only collateral that has been "disposed of' gives rise to
63

§ 9-104(a).
See§§ 9-406 & 9-408 (limiting certain restrictions on asset transfers).
65
§§ 9--406 & 9-408.
66
§ 9-315(a)(2), (c). Article 9's broader "proceeds" definition includes, inter alia,
any proceeds of sale upon the disposal of the intangible collateral, any license fees if the
debtor is the licensor of an intellectual property right, and any property collected on, or
distributed on account of, the collateral. § 9-102(64). Beyond obtaining a bare "security
interest" in the non-assignable intangible right and a right to proceeds, however, the
secured creditor receives few of the rights usually associated with a security interest.
Because of this, the interest in a contract's value outside of bankruptcy may only be
realized if the party with the anti-assignment provision is willing to recognize the
security interest and consent to an assignment of the proceeds at liquidation. In such
cases, proceeds generated from non-assignable contracts may prove to be valuable
collateral. See generally Thomas E. Plank, The Limited Security Interest in Non
Assignable Collateral Under Revised Article 9, 9 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 323, 329-30
(2001).
67
U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(64) (2001).
68 Id.
69
Unlike a security interest in original collateral, security interests in proceeds
attach automatically at the time the proceeds arise. The section 9-203 formalities for
attachment are not required for a secured creditor's interest in proceeds to arise. See id.
§§ 9-203(f), 9-3 l 5(a)(2).
64

2004-2005)

THE IMPACT OF REVISED ARTICLE 9

881

°

proceeds. 7 For example, payment streams from the licensing of
intellectual property collateral fall within the section 9-102(a)(64)(A)
definition of proceeds of the subject intellectual property, whether or not
any portion of the underlying intellectual property was "disposed of'
under the license. 71
Section 9-102(a)(64)(C)'s "rights arising out of collateral" language
could potentially embrace a variety of rights associated with original
collateral, including a broad spectrum of intangible rights. For example,
a security interest in a copyright could conceivably reach a later
produced derivative work as a proceed of the original copyright. 72 The
concept of "proceeds" may also include damage claims arising out of the
"infringement of rights in" collateral, at least "to the extent of value of
[the] collateral."73 This new definition significantly departs from the
"disposition"-based definition of proceeds under former Article 9. 74
4. Purchase-Money Security Interests

As was true of its predecessor, Revised Article 9 operates on a
system of presumptive priority for the first secured party to give public
notice of an interest. 75 Revised sections 9-103 and 9-324 provide an
exception to this presumptive rule for those creditors who provide
purchase money financing of goods and software. 76 Purchase money
transactions involving software are limited to cases where the "debtor
acquired its interest in the software in an integrated transaction in which
it acquired an interest in the goods," and the software is principally used
in the goods. 77 This limitation forecloses purchase-money security
interests in other types of intellectual property, thus potentially fore

°

7

Former Article 9 defines "proceeds" as what "is received upon the sale, exchange,
collection, or other disposition of collateral or proceeds." U.C.C. § 9-306 (1995).
71
THOMAS M. WARD, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN COMMERCE § 2:11 at 2-37-2-38
(2004). Royalties and other income streams from the licensing of intellectual property are
captured under the broader definition of "account" in Revised Article 9 and are also
"proceeds" of the intellectual property. Id.
72
See id; see also Jonathan C. Lipson, Remote Control: Revised Article 9 and the
Negotiability of Information, 63 OHIO ST. L.J. 1327, 1375 (2002/03) ("This subsection
provides explicitly what section 9-l02(a)(64)(C) only implies: namely, that a claim for
infringement of rights associated with original collateral (e.g., patent and copyrights) will
be proceeds.").
73
WARD, supra note 71, § 2:ll at 2-37-2-38; see U.C.C. § 9-312 (1995); U.C.C.
§ 9-301 (2001).
74
Compare U.C.C. § 9-306(1) (1995) (defining "proceeds" as "whatever is received
upon the ... disposition of collateral or proceeds"), with U.C.C. § 9-l02(a)(64) (2001)
(broadening the definition of"proceeds" beyond that of former§ 9-306(1)).
75
§ 9-322(a).
76
§§ 9-103 & 9-324.
77
§ 9-103(c).
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closing "new value" opportunities in the form of intellectual property for
debtors encumbered by blanket liens. 7s
5. Default and Fore<Josure under Revised Article 9
Revised Article 9's section on default does much to expand the rights
of foreclosing secured parties. 79 Collection and foreclosure remedies
have been enhanced, both substantively and procedurally.so For example,
secured parties now have the right to exercise their collection and
enforcement rights not only against debtors and account debtors, but also
against guarantors and other persons obligated on collateral.s 1
Moreover, with respect to specific collateral types such as deposit
accounts, the non-judicial collection procedures have been streamlined.s2
For example, security interests in deposit accounts can be enforced by
the creditor or bank in which the deposit account is held by "apply[ing]
the balance of the deposit account to the obligation secured by the
deposit account." 83 With respect to other secured parties who have
perfected an interest in a deposit account by control, the secured party
may instruct the depository bank to pay the balance of the account to the
secured party upon a debtor's default. 84
B. Article 9 's Securitization Revisions

Among the more dramatic modifications made to Article 9 are those
designed to have an impact upon securitization transactions. Securiti
zationss is a process by which a firm raises money by selling its
78

WARD, supra note 71, § 2:49.
Moreover, Revised Article 9 attempts to offer guidance to foreclosing parties with
respect to the requirement that foreclosure sales be conducted in a commercially
reasonable manner by setting forth far more specific requirements with respect to notice
of sales.§ 9-611(c)(3)(A), (B) & (C).
80
Donald J. Rapson, Default and Enforcement ofSecurity Interests Under Revised
Article 9, 74 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 893, 945 (1999).
81
Section 9-607 states that Article 9 can be enforced against debtors, account
debtors, and any "other person obligated on collateral to make payment or otherwise
render performance to or for the benefit of the secured party."§ 9-607(a)(I). This phrase
is broad enough to include not only an "obligor" on an instrument, but also the debtor's
rights against persons under contracts relating to the collateral, arising out of covenants,
representations, and warranties that may have been breached.
82
§ 9-607.
83
§ 9-607(a)(4).
84
§ 9-607(a)(5).
85
Securitization 's market predecessor was a method of finance known as factoring.
With its origins in the I 9th-century English textile industry, factoring is the sale of
payment streams to third parties. Since the purchaser of the receivables conducted a
credit review of customers, the seller was both relieved of the burden of conducting a
79
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receivables86 to a special purpose entity, which in turn sells the
receivables-backed securities in the public or private capital markets. 87
The paradigmatic and most commonly securitized receivables fall within
the Revised Article 9 definition of "account."88 Securitization allows
purchasers of these receivables-backed assets to insulate themselves
from many of the risks related to their originator's business, relative to
their risks if collateral were transferred to them in connection with a
secured loan. Their risk is reduced because the asset-backed securities
("ABS") purchasers are subject only to the risks associated with the
transferred assets, not to the full array of risks associated with the
originator's business. 89
The paramount risk that ABS purchasers seek to avoid is the
originator's bankruptcy. 90 The extent of the securitized assets' isolation
from the originator's bankruptcy risk, however, depends upon the
strength of the transaction's structure, which in turn is a product of the
legal regime governing the transaction. 91
credit review and able to readily liquidate its assets so that it could purchase more raw
materials. See SUSAN CRICHTON & CHARLES w. FERRIER, UNDERSTANDING FACTORING
AND TRADE CREDIT 7-9 (1986).
86
Neither former nor Revised Article 9 defines the term "receivables." For purposes
of this article, the term "receivables" is defined as payment obligations owed to a
company from a third party.
87
JAMES A. ROSENTHAL & JUAN M. OCAMPO, SECURITIZATION OF CREDIT: INSIDE THE
NEW TECHNOLOGY OF FINANCE 3 (1988). Professor Tamar Frankel, in her treatise on
securitization, broadly defines "securitization" as the transformation of an asset into
securities. This definition includes both loan participations as well as the substitution of
securities for loans. TAMAR FRANKEL, SECURITIZATION: STRUCTURED FINANCING,
FINANCIAL ASSET POOLS, AND ASSET-BACKED SECURITIES 4-5 ( 1991 ).
88
U.C.C. § 9-l02(a)(2) (2001).
89
Among them are the risks of principal concern to secured creditors: exposure to
external events such as business downturns, interest-rate fluctuations, management
decisions, and, most importantly, the originator's insolvency or bankruptcy. See
ROSENTHAL & OCAMPO, supra note 87, at 8-9, 42-43.
90
See id. at 42-43. "Generally, ... [securitized assets] are insulated from the risk of
an originator's bankruptcy by structuring the transaction so that the underlying assets are
not the property of the originator." Id. at 43. Moreover, the asset purchaser, in contrast to
the secured creditor, is not a "party in interest" in the securitizing debtor's bankruptcy
case. Section 1109(b) of the Bankruptcy Code defines "party in interest" to include "the
debtor, the trustee, a creditors' committee, an equity security holders' committee, a
creditor, an equity security holder, or any indenture trustee .... " 11 U.S.C. § l 109(b)
(2000); see also In re Martin Paint Stores, 199 B.R. 258, 264 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1996)
(stating that, for standing purposes, "party in interest" is reserved to one that is able to
assert an equitable claim against the estate).
91
See Lois R. Lupica, Asset Securitization: The Unsecured Creditor's Perspective,
76 Tux. L. REv 595 (1998) [hereinafter Asset Securitization] (describing the risks to
which traditional asset-based lenders are subject); Shane Kite, Insiders' Predictions
Point to Maturing Market, ASSET SALES REP., Oct. 18, 1999 ("In terms of credit risk, the
phrase 'bankruptcy remote' is sounding thinner and thinner, say insiders, as most feel the
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Since its original enactment, Article 9 has governed not only
traditional secured transactions, but also the sale of accounts. 92 Because
the distinction between assets sold and assets transferred as security is
often blurred, Article 9 has always required public notice filing for both
types of transactions. 93 There was a dark cloud of uncertainty, however,
hanging over the heads of many investors of securitized assets under the

legal protection offered to bond investors from an issuing company's credit troubles has
been oversold."); Suzanne Woolley, What's Next, Bridge Tolls? Almost Any Risk Can Be
Securitized-But Quality May Be Iffy, Bus. WK., Sept. 2, 1996, at 64 (quoting a rating
agency managing director urging caution to ABS investors); see also Dinsmore v.
Squadron, Ellenoff, Plesent, Sheinfeld & Sorkin (In re Towers Financial Corp.), 135 F.3d
83 7, 838-40 (2d Cir. 1998) (the originator and five SPCs filed for bankruptcy protection,
resulting in substantial losses for Tower's ABS investors). But see In re Carter Hawley
Hale Stores, Inc., No. LA 64140 JD Chapter 11, 1991 Bankr. LEXIS 2186 (Bankr. C.D.
Cal. July 30, 1991) (holding that debtor's "assignment and sale of the property'' relieved
the debtor from other liability under the agreement); In re Federated Dept. Stores, Inc.,
1992 Bankr. LEXIS 392 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio, Jan. 10, 1992) (where the court, in both
cases, respected the bankruptcy remote structure of the transaction). A recent Bankruptcy
Court opinion, in connection with its issuance of a cash collateral order, said the
following about the debtor's securitized assets:
[T]here seems to be an element of sophistry to suggest that Debtor does not
retain at least an equitable interest in the property that is subject to the interim
order. Debtor's business requires it to purchase, melt, mold and cast various
metal products. To suggest that Debtor lacks some ownership interest in
products that it creates with its own labor, as well as the proceeds to be derived
from that labor, is difficult to accept. Accordingly, the court concludes that
Debtor has at least some equitable interest in the inventory and receivables, and
that this interest is property of the Debtor's estate. This equitable interest is
sufficient to support the entry of the interim cash collateral order.
In re LTV Steel Co., 274 B.R 278, 285 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2001).
92
The original version of Article 9, enacted in 1962, governed the sales of"contract
rights." The term "contract rights" was originally defined in Article 9 as "any right to
payment under a contract not yet earned by performance and not evidenced by an
instrument or chattel paper." This definition meant that once performed, some contract
rights became accounts and others became general intangibles. As such, under the
original version of Article 9, the statute potentially governed the sale of general
intangibles. U.C.C. § 9-106 (1962); see GILMORE, supra note 8, at 379. The definition of
"account" in the 1972 Amendments to Article 9 (the first version adopted by all fifty
states), however, was narrowed in scope from its original definition. Sales of contract
rights and other general intangibles were excluded (but the sale of chattel paper was
included). Dan T. Coenen, Priorities in Accounts: The Crazy Quilt of Current Law and a
Proposal for Reform, 45 VAND. L. REV. 1061, 1066 (1992); U.C.C. § 9-102(l)(a) & (b)
(1998); see also Morton M. Sult, Accounts Receivable Financing: Operational Patterns
Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 11 ARl.z. L. REv. I (1969) (describing accounts
receivable financing prior to the enactment of Article 9 and under the UCC).
93
The definition of "security interest" in section 1-20 l (37) includes the interest of
the "buyer of accounts ... subject to Article 9" as a security interest. U.C.C. § 1-201(35)
(2001
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old Article 9 regime. While Article 9 governed the sale of accounts,94
many commonly securitized assets fell outside the definition of
"account," and it was not always clear, or if clear it was not always easy,
for transferees to perfect their interests in these assets. 95 Perhaps because
there was so much money to be made by so many participants, this
cloudiness did not inhibit the enthusiastic growth of the market for
securitized debt. 96
Notwithstanding robust participation in the securitization market
over the past decade and a half, there remained the problem of a
discrepant legal regime governing securitizations.97 In an attempt to
reconcile the governing law with common securitization transactions, the
Article 9 drafters included a wider variety of rights to payment arising
from the transfer of rights in both tangible and intangible property within
Revised Article 9's definition of "account."98 The sale of the right to
94

Id. Fonner article 9 also governed the sale of chattel paper. See U.C.C. § 9102(l)(b) (1995).
95
The asset-backed securities market began in 1985 when the Sperry Corporation
originated the first true securitization, in which it sold $192 million lease-backed notes in
the public markets. The second deal was originated by General Motors Acceptance
Corporation, in which eight billion dollars between late 1985 and 1986 was securitized.
Three investment banking organizations captured the bulk of the lucrative commissions
from these deals. Seeing an opportunity to expand into this market, at least fourteen
major investment banks began aggressively seeking asset-backed security issuances to
underwrite. See Comm. on Bankr. & Corp. Reorganization of the Ass'n of the Bar of the
City of New York, Structured Financing Techniques, 50 Bus. LAW. 527, 538-39 (1995).
See Lupica, Asset Securitization, supra note 91, at 608--09. The article states:
Following [the] early [securitization] transactions, firms became
increasingly more creative and began securitizing automobile loans, leases, and
credit card receivables. As the market for ABS has expanded in recent years,
issuers have become even more imaginative with respect to the type of
receivables securitized. Examples of recently issued [asset-backed securities]
include bond issuances backed by unpaid real estate taxes, securities backed by
hotel and hospitality receivables, taxi cab medallion-backed securities,
securities backed by the excess spread from previously issued credit card
securitizations, securities backed by health-care receivables, and securities
backed by government-contract receivables.
Id. at 602--03 (citations omitted). The total debt owed by issuers of asset backed securities
(excluding mortgages) was $713 billion at the end of 1995. By the end of September
2001, it was $2.02 trillion. See Board of Gov. of Fed. Res. System: Summary of Credit
Market Debt Outstanding, 88 FED. REs. BULL. A40, tbl. 1.59 (2002).
96
Lupica, Asset Securitizaton, supra note 91, at 608--09.
97
Id. at 610; see also Ted Janger, Crystals and Mud in Bankruptcy Law: Judicial
Competence and Statutory Design, 43 ARIZ. L. REv. 559 (2001) (examining the statutory
structure governing securitization transactions).
98
Revised Section 9-102(a)(2) now reads:
[A) right to payment of a monetary obligation, whether or not earned by
performance, (i) for property that has been or is to be sold, leased, licensed,
assigned or otherwise disposed of, (ii) for services rendered or to be
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payment ansmg from the sale, lease, license, or assignment of com
mercial and consumer loans (including credit card receivables), leases,
public utility and hotel services, insurance and franchise payments, and
income streams from the license of intellectual property, will all give rise
to "accounts" under Revised Article 9. 99
As a final "belt and suspenders" provision, Revised Article 9 also
includes new section 9-318, which states that "a debtor that has sold an
account, chattel paper, payment intangible, or promissory note" (all
commonly securitized assets) retains no "legal or equitable interests in
the collateral sold." 100 While this provision does not determine whether a
transfer is a sale or a loan, 101 if the transfer is determined to be a sale
under non-Article 9 law, 102 section 9-318 makes "explicit what was
implicit"-that the debtor retains no interest in the receivables sold. 103
(iii) for a policy of insurance issued or to be issued, (iv) for a secondary
obligation incurred or to be incurred, (v) for energy provided or to be provided,
(vi) for the use or hire of a vessel under a charter or other contract, (vii) arising
out of the use of a credit or charge card or information contained on or for use
with the card, or (viii) as winnings in a lottery or other game of chance operated
or sponsored by a State or governmental unit of a State .... The term includes
health-care-insurance receivables. The term does not include (i) rights to
payment evidenced by chattel paper or an instrument, (ii) commercial tort
claims, (iii) deposit accounts, (iv) investment property, (v) letter-of-credit
rights or letters of credit, or (vi) rights to payment for money or funds advanced
or sold, other than rights arising out of the use of a credit or charge card or
information contained on or for use with the card.
U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(2) (2001). As noted above, Article 9 sales coverage is further
expanded to include payment intangibles and promissory notes. Loan pool participations
are paradigmatic payment intangibles. Article 9 provides for the automatic perfection of
transfers of loan participations. See§ 9-109(a)(3) ("[T]his article applies to ... a sale of
accounts, chattel paper, payment intangibles, or promissory notes.").
99
See§ 9-102(a)(2). For example, the securitization of payments from the licensing
of intellectual property are accounts and thus subject to the filing and priority rules of
Revised Article 9. The securitization of securities backed by royalty streams from the sale
of music has recently become a more common phenomenon. Investment banker David
Pullman, architect of the first such deal-the sale of assets backed by David Bowie's
royalty stream--observed, "There is a tremendous shift in wealth from hard assets-steel
and manufacturing-to intellectual property, entertainment." Kathy Bergen, 100 Shares
ofPavarotti? Stars Turn to Securitization, SUN-SENTINEL (Miami), Dec. 6, 1997, at 16C;
see also Joe Queenan, Dead Men Earning, FORBES, Mar. 22, 1999 at 253; Brendan
Weston, The Bonds Formerly Known as Artists, ROB MAGAZINE REPORTER, May 1999.
100
§ 9-3 l 8(a).
101
This state-law determination turns largely on the extent to which the transferor
has transferred the risks of the asset's collectability. See Major's Furniture Mart, Inc. v.
Castle Credit Corp., 602 F.2d 538, 545-46 (3d Cir. 1979).
102
Historically, the Bankruptcy Code has relied upon non-bankruptcy law to define
property interests under the Code. When the issue is whether a transfer of Article 9 assets
is properly included in the transferee's bankruptcy estate, the nature of the transfer, as
well as the necessary steps to establish the transferee's property rights, has always been
determined by state law. Recently, Congress tried to change this. There was a provision
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C. Article 9 's Procedural Revisions
1. Single Place to File and Supergeneric Descriptions
In an effort to improve the functional efficiency of the secured
transactions system, Revised Article 9 simplifies the procedures for the
perfection of Article 9 security interests. 104 For example, in contrast to
the complicated rules setting forth office or offices in which secured
creditors should file their financing statements (which turned on the
category of asset taken as collateral, as well as whether such asset was
tangible 105 or intangible 106), Revised Article 9 provides for a single place
to file against all of a debtor's assets. 107 Secured parties seeking
perfection no longer have to determine the location of their debtor's
collateral or worry about whether it has been moved. The often-clouded
issue of locating the debtor's "chief executive office" 108 is eliminated by
Revised Article 9's new rule for determining the location of the debtor. w9
Secured creditors seeking to perfect security interests in debtors who are
corporations, partnerships, or limited liability companies will file their
financing statements in the jurisdiction where the debtor entity was
organized. 110 The new Article 9 rule eliminates the need for creditors to

included in the original draft of the Bankruptcy Reform legislation redefining the concept
of "estate." Bankruptcy Reform Act, H.R. 2415, 106th Cong. § 912 (2000). Such
redefinition would have removed from the bankruptcy court's jurisdiction "eligible
assets" transferred by the debtor to an "eligible entity in connection with an asset-backed
securitization." "Eligible assets" are defined to include commonly securitized receiv
ables. This provision would have been a dramatic change in the law defining estate
property. Id. In 2001, this provision was removed from the Bankruptcy Reform bill. See
Glenn R. Simpson & Susan Pulliam, Congressional Negotiators Drop Measure in
Bankruptcy Bill Tied to Enron Failure, WALL ST. J., Feb. 28, 2001, at A4.
103
U.C.C. § 9-318 cmt. 2 (2001).
104
Harris & Mooney, Reflections, supra note 6, at 1360.
105
Under former Article 9, a party seeking to perfect its security interest against
tangible assets had to file a financing statement in the jurisdiction where the assets were
located. See U.C.C. § 9-103 (1995).
106
Former Article 9 provided that security interests against intangible assets could
be perfected by filing in the jurisdiction where the debtor was located. See§ 9-103(3)(a)
& (b).
u.c.c. § 9-301 (2001).
U.C.C. § 9-103(3)(d) (1995) ("A debtor shall be deemed located at his place of
business ifhe has one, [and] at his chief executive office ifhe has more than one place of
business .... ").
9
10 u.c.c. § 9-307 (2001).
llO Id. Section 9-307(e) states, "A registered organization that is organized under the
law of a State is located in that State," thus determining that for a "registered" entity, the
place to file is the place of organization. § 9-307(e). This results in a corresponding
headache for searchers, although not as much of a headache as looking everywhere
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make judgment calls about where businesses are located and to chase
inventory, equipment, and debtors as they move from state to state in
order to maintain perfected status. 111
Another striking change to Article 9 permits secured parties to use
"supergeneric" descriptions of collateral in financing statements. 112
Typically, supergeneric collateral descriptions .read, "all the debtor's
assets." 113 Multi-page attachments enumerating every item of collateral
or collateral type are no longer necessary for secured parties to take a
blanket lien on a debtor's assets. These rules are simplifications of the
formalities Article 9 requires that will, in effect, make it easier to perfect
and maintain a blanket lien and harder for secured parties to make
mistakes. 114
2. Two-Tier Perfection Rules
Revised Article 9 includes a two-tier rule for omissions in financing
statements. 115 Pursuant to section 9-502(a), only three types of errors in
the financing statement make it vulnerable to a bankruptcy trustee's
"strong ann" 116 challenge: the omission of i) the debtor's name, ii) the
creditor's name, or iii)· a description of the collateral. 117 There are,
however, additional requirements that the financing statement must
satisfy in order to be accepted by the filing office; 118 it must include the

organization had tangible assets under old Article 9. For a non-registered organization, a
debtor is located "at its place of business."§ 9-307(a) & (b).
111
To illustrate, a secured party will file a financing statement in the Maine
Secretary of State's office to perfect a security interest in the assets of Smith's
Provisions, Inc., a Maine corporation, with inventory and equipment located in New York
and Pennsylvania and its principal place of business in New Hampshire. If the chief
executive office of Smith's Provisions, Inc., moves to another state, or if inventory or
equipment is relocated, unlike under former Article 9, a creditor having filed a financing
statement in Maine would remain fully perfected.
112
See § 9-502(a)(3) ("a financing statement is sufficient only if it ... indicates the
collateral covered by the financing statement"); § 9-504 ("A financing statement
sufficiently indicates the collateral that it covers if the financing statement provides: ( 1) a
description of the collateral pursuant to Section 9-108; or (2) an indication that the
financing statement covers all assets or all personal property."); § 9-108(a) ("if it
reasonably identifies what is described"); § 9-504 cmt. 2 (stating that a financing
statement sufficiently indicates the collateral if it covers "all assets or all personal
property").
113
§ 9-108(c) & cmt. 2.
114
Harris & Mooney, Policy & Impact, supra note 7, at 99-101.
115
§ 9-502(a).
116
Section 544(a) of the Bankruptcy Code allows for the avoidance of unperfected
security interests. See 11 U.S.C. § 544(a) (2000). See generally Pryor, supra note 20.
117
§ 9-502(a).
118
§§ 9-502(a), 9-516(b)(S)(C),
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debtor's jurisdiction of organization, organizational type, and
organizational identification number. 119 If, however, notwithstanding the
absence of any or all of this "required" information, the financing
statement is accepted by the filing office, the secured party, while not
perfected in a priority contest between it and another secured creditor or
purchaser, is deemed validly perfected when subject to the scrutiny and
powers of the debtor's bankruptcy trustee. 120 Thus, it is less likely that a
filed creditor will have its security interest defeated by a bankruptcy
trustee than it is that a creditor with a flawed financing statement will
lose a priority contest against another secured creditor or purchaser.
Moreover, with respect to certain specified types of collateral,
Revised Article 9 similarly makes it easier to protect secured creditors
from the bankruptcy trustee's strong arm. For example, security interests
in deposit accounts can be perfected by third-party creditors gaining
"control"121 over the account, but that secured party is vulnerable to
defeat by the bank in which the account is held if the bank exercises its
right of setoff. 122 A secured creditor that has established "control" over a
deposit account, however, is fully secured in a contest against the trustee
in bankruptcy. 123
There is a similar rule with respect to instruments. 124 For example, a
transfer of instruments may be perfected by filing, and such perfection
will defeat the interest of the bankruptcy trustee. 125 Perfection by
possession, however, is required to win a priority contest with another
secured party or a purchaser. 126
119

§§ 9-502(a), 9-516(b)(S)(c), 9-520(a).
§§ 9-338(1}-{2), 9-502(a).
121
See infra notes 212-24 and accompanying text.
122
"Setoff'' is defined as "a debtor's right to reduce the amount ofa debt by any sum
the creditor owes the debtor; the counterbalancing sum owed by the creditor." BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY 1376 (7th ed. 1999).
123
§§ 9-104(a), 9-3 l 7(a).
124
"Instruments" are defined in Section 9-102(a)(47) as:
[A] negotiable instrument or any other writing that evidences a right to the
payment of a monetary obligation, is not itself a security agreement or lease,
and is of a type that in ordinary course of business is transferred by delivery
with any necessary indorsement or assignment. The term does not include
(i) investment property, (ii) letters of credit, or (iii) writings that evidence a
right to payment arising out of the use of a credit or charge card or information
contained on or for use with the card.
§ 9-102(a)(47). This was the rule under former Article 9, too.
125
§ 9-312(a).
126
§§ 9-330(d), 9-312(a), 9-314(a). This has been the rule under former Article 9
with respect to "investment property." A secured party seeking to perfect an interest in
investment property could file a financing statement. That filing, however, would not
defeat the interest of a competing secured creditor or purchaser. It would, however, defeat
the interest of a trustee in bankruptcy exercising its strong arm powers. See U.C.C. § 9
120
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A. The Theoretical Defense ofRevised Article 9
As described in Part II above, Revised Article 9 is a significant
departure from the former version of Article 9. Clearly, the changes
made were designed to enhance the effective operation and efficiency of
what has been viewed by some as a very effective and theoretically
defensible statute. 127 Each specific revision was included to address a
perceived problem or deficiency in the old statute. 128
The revisions were premised on the idea of increased efficiency
gains to secured creditors would outweigh any losses to third parties. 129
The gains enjoyed by secured creditors include a lower lending risk and a
correspondingly increased chance of repayment. The lowered risk results
from the lender's enhanced ability to monitor and control a debtor's
behavior, the initial diligence concerning the identified collateral, and the
lender's greater confidence in the value of the collateral relative to
debtor's cash flow. 130 Proponents of Revised Article 9 predicted that the
changes would make it "easier and less expensive to create and perfect

115(5) (1995). Revised Article 9 carries this rule forward with respect to investment
property. See§§ 9-312(a), 9-314(a).
127
Harris & Mooney, A Property-Based Theory, supra note 32, at 2052-53. The
authors state:
The positive value of permitting debtors to give security freely and
effectively suggests two important rules of thumb to be followed in the process
of revising Article 9. First, the drafters should purge Article 9 of obstacles to
the creation of effective security interests. Because there is nothing generally
unsound or suspect about the creation of effective security interests, formalistic
requirements that upset the intentions of the parties and prove to be traps for the
unwary should be eliminated. Second, the scope of Article 9 should be
expanded. Many of the common-law rules governing the creation of security
interests in personal property are uncertain and cumbersome. Insofar as the
creation of security interests is easier, less costly, and more certain under
Article 9 than under common-law rules, expansion of the statute is likely to
serve the overarching goal of effectuating the will of the parties. The drafters
should add limitations and restrictions only when they are demonstrably
warranted in particular circumstances. Moreover, the presumption against
interference with party autonomy should extend to existing impediments (e.g.,
public notice requirements) as well as to proposed new ones.
Id.
128
Harris & Mooney, Policy & Impact, supra note 7, at 8~8.
129
Harris & Mooney, Reflections, supra note 6, at 1360.
130
See generally, e.g., Richard L. Barnes, The Efficiency Justification for Secured
Transactions: Foxes with Saxes and Other Fanciful Stuff, 42 U. KAN. L. REV. 13 (1993)
(describing attempts by legal scholars to provide economic justifications for secured
credit).
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security interests and to achieve priority over competing claimants." 131
As argued, Revised Article 9's expanded scope and procedural
simplifications, in enabling creditors to take security interests in a greater
number and type of assets with greater facility, simply make a good thing
better. 132
B. A Competing Vision

Not surprisingly, a competing vision has been put forth of what may
result from Article 9's revision. First, if streamlining procedures and
expanding Article 9's scope results in an increase in the availability and a
decrease in the price of secured credit, it may also have the pernicious
effect of raising the price of unsecured credit. 133 Further, because Article
9 offers the enhanced potential for a dominant secured creditor to
encumber all of a debtor's assets, subsequent financing may be more
difficult to obtain. 134 This may result in reduced cash flow, which
correspondingly may mean that trade creditors, employees, tort
claimants, and other undiversified creditors 135 will be compromised. 136
The Article 9 revision may also have an impact on the business
bankruptcy process. 137 A secured creditor, by virtue of its blanket
security interest, places constraints on a debtor's decision with respect to
both its assets and its business. Once bankruptcy is filed however, such
constraints become control over the debtor's reorganization. 138 Such
control by a dominant secured party, as a proxy for the privatization of
business bankruptcy, has far-reaching implications. 139

131

Harris & Mooney, Reflections, supra note 6, at 1360.
Harris & Mooney, A Property-Based Theory, supra note 32, at 2053.
133
Kenneth N. Klee, Barbarians at the Trough: Riposte in Defense of the Warren
Carve-out Proposal, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 1466, 1469 (1997); LoPucki, Creditor's
Bargain, supra note 18, at 1898; Warren, Imperfect Information, supra note 21, at 1386.
134
Klee, supra note 133, at 1475.
135
Undiversified creditors are those that lend in one (or few) industries. See Adler,
Finance's Divide, supra note 19, at n.35.
136
LoPucki, Creditor's Bargain, supra note 18, at 1898; Lynn LoPucki, The Death
ofLiability, 106 YALE L.J. 1, 14-16 (1996) [hereinafter Liability].
137
Jay Lawrence Westbrook, The Control of Wealth in Bankruptcy, 82 TEX. L. REv.
795, 837-43 (2004) [hereinafter The Control of Wealth].
133 Id.
139
Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen, The End of Bankruptcy, 55 STAN. L.
REv. 751, 784-85 (2002) [hereinafter Endo/Bankruptcy].
132
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BEYOND THEORY TO EMPIRICISM

Even if one or more of the above-described theories is intuitively
appealing, its predictive power remains unproven. 140 There has been no
comprehensive empirical study of Revised Article 9's effects on the
credit markets or on the bankruptcy process verifying or disproving any
academic theories advanced. 141 The execution of such a study would
bring a higher level of confidence and objective certainty to the various
"conclusions" concerning the effects of the secured credit system than is
possible based merely on speculation and prediction. Once we have
objective, scientifically verifiable information about the effects of
secured credit, many of us will have to modify our "theories, opinions
and beliefs" in accordance with empirical findings. 142 At that point, we
can engage in a normative discussion about the wisdom of the unlimited
and unqualified use of secured credit.
A. Empiricism v. Theory - The Case o/Durrett

The importance of empiricism in evaluating legal rule changes is
well illustrated by what is known as the "Durrett Controversy." 143 In
1980, in the case of Durrett v. Washington National Insurance Co., 144 the
Fifth Circuit held that a regularly conducted, non-collusive pre
bankruptcy foreclosure sale of a debtor's real property at less than 70%
of the property's fair market value was voidable as a fraudulent
140

See Mario J. Rizzo, The Mirage of Efficiency, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 641, 642
( 1980) ("Unless the empirical counterpart to a theoretical standard can be identified,
advocacy of the latter cannot lead to any change in or validation of existing law.");
Gordon Tullock, Two Kinds of Legal Efficiency, 8 HOFSTRA L. REv. 659, 668 (1980)
("[T]he statement is made that ... this particular rule is the most efficient. It may or
may not be. The only way to tell is to engage in careful research .... ").
141
There have, however, been myriad studies of the credit markets conducted by
business and economics scholars. None of these have endeavored to address the debate
concerning the effects and efficiency of the continued existence and expansion of secured
credit. See e.g., EDWARD I. ALTMAN, BANKRUPTCY, CREDIT RISK AND HIGH YIELD JUNK
BONDS, at xxiii (2002) (detailing studies conducted by Professor Altman and other
scholars of what was referred to as "the 'dark side' of Finance-bankruptcies, corporate
distress, defaults, etc." (Preface)); Mitchell A. Petersen & Raghuram G. Rajan, Trade
Credit: Theories and Evidence, REVIEW OF FINANCIAL STUDIES, v. 10 n.3 (1997); ALLEN
N. BERGER ET AL., THE EFFECT OF MARKET SIZE STRUCTURE ON COMPETITION, THE CASE
OF SMALL BUSINESS LENDING (Fed. Reserve Bank of Chicago Research, Working Paper
No. 01-10, 2001); JEREMY BERKOWITZ, BANKRUPTCY AND SMALL FIRMS' ACCESS TO
CREDIT (Nat'! Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 9010, 2002).
142
NEALE & LIEBERT, supra note 27, at 9.
143
Philip Shuchman, Data on the Durrett Controversy, 9 CARDOZO L. REv. 605
(1987).
144
Durrett v. Washington Nat'! Ins. Co., 621 F.2d 201 (5th Cir.
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conveyance. 145 When this dramatic pronouncement was made, members
of the commercial law community expected a seismic market
response; 146 it was widely anticipated that the availability of credit would
contract and the price of credit would increase. 147 This anticipation was
fueled by writings critical of Durrett asserting the various adverse effects
the rule would impose on the credit market. 148
In seeking to determine the extent to which credit markets responded
to the rule change announced in Durrett, Professor Philip Shuchman
undertook an empirical study of the cost and availability of residential
mortgage loans in states in which the Durrett rule was adopted, and he
compared that data to the cost and availability of residential mortgage
loans in states that rejected the Durrett rule. 149 Data was collected from a
variety of publicly available sources, including Federal Home Loan Bank
Board and Housing and Urban Development surveys. 150 Interest rates,

145

Id. at 202.
Shuchman, supra note 143, at 616.
147
See generally id.
148
Id. at 618; see also Robert M. Zinman et al., Fraudulent Transfers According to
Alden, Gross and Borowitz: A Tale of Two Circuits, 39 Bus. LAW. 977, 1013 (1984):
The immediate effect of the acceptance of the Durrett rule would be to chill
bidding at foreclosure sales. Third parties will be unlikely to bid for properties
knowing that the application of fraudulent-conveyance Jaws could set aside the
sale at a later date. The absence of competitive bidding will in all likelihood
reduce prices at foreclosure sales and increase the likelihood of deficiency
judgments in those states where they are permitted.
Id.; Lawrence D. Coppel & Lewis A. Kann, Defanging Durrett: The Established Law of
"Transfer", 100 BANKING L.J. 676, 682 (1983) ("Du"ett ... drives bids down [on
foreclosure sale prices] . . . . "). Two years following the Du"ett decision, the Ninth
Circuit heard the case of Madrid v. Lawyers Title Insurance Corp., in which it similarly
faced the question whether a non-collusive, regularly conducted nonjudicial foreclosure
sale could be deemed a fraudulent conveyance. Among the writings critical of Du"ett
that predicted dire and significant effects were amicus briefs in the Madrid case. The
court in Madrid ultimately concluded that a sale under such conditions at least satisfies
the "reasonably equivalent value" requirement of Bankruptcy Code Section 548(a)(2).
Lawyers Title Ins. Co. v. Madrid (Jn re Madrid), 21 B.R. 424, 426-27 (B.A.P. 9th Cir.
1982) (B.A.P.), ajf'd on other grounds, 725 F.2d l 197 (9th Cir. 1984).
149
Shuchman, supra note 143, at 624. In the study conducted by Professor
Shuchman, interest rates, loan to price ratios, and total real estate-related loans were
studied between the period before Du"ett was decided and after the Ninth Circuit's
decision in In re Madrid, 725 F.2d 1197 (9th Cir. 1984).
150
Data for Professor Shuchman's study was collected from the Federal Home
Loan Bank Board (Primary Mortgage Interest Rate Surveys), the Federal Home Loan
Mortgage Corporation, the Federal Home Loan Bank of San Francisco, the Federal
Home Loan Bank of Cincinnati, the Department of Housing and Urban Development,
the Sovran Mortgage Corporation, and HSH Associations. Professor Shuchman noted,
"While problems can arise from QRaXQLIRUPmethods of data collection, in the gross
terms we employed for our purposes, the possible errors due to this artifact should
146
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loan-to-price ratios, and the number of real estate acquisition loans were
measured in the relevant jurisdictions before and after the Durrett
decision. 151
The study revealed that the Durrett rule had little, if any, impact on
the market for real-estate-related financing. 152 Though Professor
Shuchman cautiously offered possible alternative causes for the absence
of a market response to the Durrett ruling, 153 there was sufficient data to
logically deduce that the "claimed societal effects" of the Durrett rule
were without basis. 154 Professor Shuchman observed that many of the
pre-study conclusions concerning the effects of the Durrett rule on the
market were derived from theoretical models, not "the known sets of
empirical facts." 155 He cautioned legal scholars and other commentators
against drawing conclusions concerning the causal effects of new legal
rules based solely on theories untested by empirical study. 156
B. Empiricism and Revised Article 9

The path to the empirical study of Article 9 has recently been forged,
and this early empiricism will go far to help form the contours of more
comprehensive studies to come. 157 With the objective of explaining how
distort matters. The numbers of mortgages and the total dollar amounts are so great that
the variations should be relatively small." Shuchman, supra note 143, at 624-25.
151 Id.
152
Id. at 615-16.
153
See id. at 637--40 (setting forth eleven "other possible and plausible explanations
for the before-and-after data" in his study).
154
Id. at 640--41.
155
Id. at 618.
156
Id. at 618-19. Recognizing tbe limited scope of his study, Professor Shuchman
observed that no one had proved "the conventional economic model[,] which holds that
the perception of increased risk flowing from what will or what might happen in tbe
legal process ... [would] have dramatic effects on the mortgage market." Id. at 619.
Indeed, recent studies in behavioral economics have called into question the accuracy of
the traditional wisdom that markets readily respond to changes in legal rules. Robert K.
Rasmussen, Behavioral Economics, The Economic Analysis ofBankruptcy Law and the
Pricing of Credit, 51 VAND. L. REv. 1679, 1691-92 (1998) (noting skepticism that the
Supreme Court's decision in Barnhill v. Johnson (holding that a payment to a lender is
deemed to be made when the payment check is honored by the debtor's bank for
purposes of preference law) would be reflected in an increase in the price of credit);
Symposium, Contemporary Issues in Bankruptcy and Corporate Law, Panel Discussion
and Question-Answer Session, 61 U. CIN. L. REV. 569, 571 (1992). Professor David
Gray Carlson noted that "not every change in the law produces a change in the price of
credit" and further observed that the extent to which the market responds to changes in
the law is an empirical question. Id.
157
See, e.g., Claire A. Hill, Essay: Is Secured Debt Efficient?, 80 Tux. L. REv. 1117
(2002); Ronald J. Mann, Strategy and Force in the Liquidation of Secured Debt, 96
MICH. L. REV. 159, 233 (1997) [hereinafter Strategy and Force]; Ronald Mann,
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the credit markets work in practice, two scholars have made recent
contributions that help place many of the questions concerning the
workings of the credit markets in their proper context. 158 Though the
narrow scope and abbreviated methodology of these studies invite a more
extensive empirical study, 159 a number of interesting and intuitively
appealing observations were made.
First, it was observed that there is not one market for credit, but
many. 16° Factors such as the size of the business, the nature of the
business, the type of assets a firm has, and the circumstances in which a
firm finds itself, 161 all have an impact on whether, and the extent to
which, secured credit is used. 162 Thus, conclusions drawn in a study of
one market segment will not necessarily be valid as applied to another
segment.
Moreover, there are a variety of transaction structures that have the
"paradigmatic features" of secured debt. 163 These include the grant of a
security interest in all of a debtor's assets (otherwise known as a "blanket
lien"), as well as in part of a debtor's assets, including a targeted security
interest in certain specified assets. 164 Additionally, a "secured credit"
transaction can take the form of a transfer of assets as collateral, or the
securitization or sale of liquid assets, commonly known as receivables. 165
Explaining the Pattern of Secured Credit, 110 HARV. L. REV. 625, 628-29 (1997)
[hereinafter Explaining the Pattern].
158
Hill, supra note 157; Mann, Explaining the Pattern, supra note 157.
159
In the study conducted by Professor Hill, twenty lawyers, bankers, and business
people with expertise in the credit markets were interviewed. Hill, supra note 157, at
1117. Similarly, Professor Mann's studies were based on twenty-three interviews with
participants in the credit markets, as well as three case studies, each one with a separate
type of lender. Mann, Explaining the Pattern, supra note 157, at 631; Mann, Strategy and
Force, supra note 157, at 235.
160
Mann, Explaining the Pattern, supra note 157, at 628-29. There is "relatively
infrequent use of secured credit by [large] companies." Id. at 626; LoPucki, Liability,
supra note 136, at 14 ("[S]ecured debt strategies ... are employed primarily by small,
relatively uncreditworthy businesses."); Robert E. Scott, A Relational Theory ofSecured
Financing, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 901, 940 (1986) ("Most secured debt is issued by
relatively small, young, and growing firms."). One scholar who has studied the market
noted that "as a borrower's financial strength increases, secured credit becomes a less
attractive alternative." Mann, Explaining the Pattern, supra note 157, at 674.
161
The factors by which firms can be distinguished include credit history and
quality. Hill, supra note 157, at 1124.
162 Id.
163
Id. at 1124-26.
164
Id. at 1124-25. An example of this type of grant of security is inventory and
accounts financing. Id. at 1141.
165
Id. at 1125. Professor Hill also includes a description of a lease financing
transaction, making the point that:
The longer the term of the lease relative to the life of the asset, the more
leasing resembles secured debt. . . . A continuum exists between the most
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Not all firms can or will engage in all varieties of secured transactions,
and therefore explanations concerning the use of secured credit are not
likely to hold across market segments.
Beyond the description of the types of borrowers that access the
secured credit market, it was further reported that the experience of
managing a lending relationship may be somewhat different than
assumed. 166 According to some survey respondents, the legal framework
governing secured transactions sets forth a system where a debtor's
behavior is guided toward secured lender repayment well before loans
fall into distress. 167 Belying the traditional perspective that Article 9's
grant of a right to repossess and liquidate collateral is at the center of a
creditor's motivation in taking a security interest, the study observed that
the strategic aspects of the secured lending arrangement were more
important to secured lenders than their ability to ultimately force a liqui
dation of collateral. 168 Instead, most secured lenders holding distressed
loans were paid either from the cash flow resulting from the borrower's
continued operation, from the debtor's sale of the collateral, or from the
proceeds of the debtor's refinancing. 169 Because the liquidation value of
collateral rarely, if ever, approaches the value of an outstanding loan, the
Article 9 foreclosure and sale provisions were viewed by the lenders
surveyed as the repayment option of last resort. 170 By strategically using
collection devices outside the scope of Article 9's remedial provisions,
lenders in the majority of cases studied were paid in full. 171
The "strategic pressure" that most influences creditor repayment
begins long before a debtor's financial distress. 172 This pressure includes
the lender's ability to limit subsequent borrowing, to exert leverage to
encourage repayment, and to motivate the borrower not to engage in
risky behavior. 173 Although these behavior-maximizing incentives all
operate in the shadow of Article 9 remedies, the study concluded that
there was limited reliance by lenders on the formal statutory liquidation
lease-like lease (such as a short-term lease of a water cooler) and a debt-like
lease (such as a long-term lease of an aircraft); much leasing falls somewhere
in the middle.
Id. at 1128 (footnotes omitted).
166
Mann, Strategy and Force, supra note 157, at 233.
167 Id.
168
Id. at 233-36.
169
Id. at 234.
170
Id. at 164.
171 Id.
172
The issue of leverage in negotiation has been assiduously studied in negotiation
theory literature. See, e.g., Robert S. Adler & Elliot M. Silverstein, When David Meets
Goliath: Dealing with Power Differentials in Negotiations, 5 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 1
(2000).
173
Mann, Explaining the Pattern, supra note 157, at 641.
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processes. 174 Control over the debtor's business and behavior offered the
primary benefit to secured lenders. 175
V.

REVISED ARTICLE 9 AND BUSINESS BANKRUPTCY THEORY

When a business debtor files for bankruptcy, a lender's "strategic
pressure" to coerce repayment will be to no avail. Once the bankruptcy
system is accessed, voluntary repayment is no longer an option and the
distributive baseline with respect to creditors' interests in debtors' assets
is established by Article 9. 176 As such, changes made to the Article 9
rules have the potential to resonate far more loudly in bankruptcy.
Depending upon how one sees the theory and purpose of the bankruptcy
system, 177 this may or may not be a positive development.
A. Critics ofJudicially Supervised Reorganization

The business bankruptcy system continues to be the subject of
intense scholarly debate. 178 Some scholars have been openly critical of
the current business bankruptcy system, with many of these critics
subscribing to what has been characterized as the contract theory

174

Id. at 639-41.
Id. at 641.
176
Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48, 55 (1979) ("Property interests are created
and defined by state law.").
177
For a survey of current bankruptcy scholarship, see Douglas G. Baird,
Bankruptcy's Uncontested Axioms, 108 YALE L.J. 573, 577 (1998) (referring to those
holding each of the two primary perspectives on business bankruptcy as "proceduralists"
and "traditionalists"); see also JANIS SARRA, CREDITOR RIGHTS AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST
34-50 (2003) (identifying four general bankruptcy theories: 1) Market Theory, under
which "clarif[ying] priority of creditors' claims" is the sole objective; 2) Debt Collection
Theory, under which "bankruptcy's normative policy objective is to collectivize the
process by which a debtor's assets are made available to claimants"; 3) Rehabilitation
Theory, under which the "preservation of the firm as an ongoing entity" is a primary
objective; and 4) Enterprise Theory, under which "enterprise value maximization" is the
"normative objective of corporate decision making").
178
The issue of whether and to what extent the bankruptcy system ought to be
reformed has been before Congress for four consecutive congressional sessions. While
much of the proposed bankruptcy reform legislation has targeted the consumer
bankruptcy system, reform of the business bankruptcy system has also been part of the
legislative agenda. Chapter 11 has been criticized for being both inefficient and
ineffective. There has been no legislative provision, however, to directly abolish
business reorganization. See I I U.S.C. § 365 (2000) (allowing for the acceptance or
rejection ofexecutory contracts); 11 U.S.C. § 544(a) (2000) (allowing for the avoidance
by the trustee of unperfected security interests).
175
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approach to bankruptcy. 179 Adherents to this theoretical approach posit
that business bankruptcies today are dominated by a single controlling
party. 180 Indeed, in recent years contract theory bankruptcy scholars have
focused their energy on advancing criticism of and alternatives to the
traditional judicially supervised chapter 11. 181 For example, in a recent
article, Professors Douglas Baird and Robert Rasmussen declared
chapter 11 obsolete and offered three central arguments in support of this
declaration. 182 First, they claimed that where firms' assets are largely
fungible, going concern value is an antiquated notion. In the absence of
specialized, firm-specific assets, there is nothing unique to be preserved
through reorganization that could not be deployed and utilized in another
enterprise. 183 Second, they argued that bankruptcy-court supervision of a
firm as a surrogate for responsible management is no longer necessary,
179

Barry E. Adler, Financial and Political Theories of American Corporate
Bankruptcy, 45 STAN. L. REv. 311, 319-24 (1993); Baird & Rasmussen, End of
Bankruptcy, supra note 139, at 758-59.
,
180
Baird & Rasmussen, End of Bankruptcy, supra note 139, at 784--85. Baird and
Rasmussen explain:
The revolving credit facility, installed as the firm begins to have trouble
making debt payments, also gives the lender who runs it the ability to control
the firm inside of chapter 11 as well as out. Most large firms that enter chapter
11 lack enough free cash flow to operate without debtor-in-possession (DIP)
financing. The control that the lender has over cash collateral makes it hard to
enter into a financing arrangement without its explicit blessing. Its blessing can
be contingent upon many things, including a requirement that the firm be sold
as a going concern within a fixed period of time. At other times, the lender may
give the current managers one more chance to turn around the fortunes of the
firm, but it may be time constrained. A sale of assets may not be required
immediately, but the DIP lending agreement may require that the assets be sold
if the firm is not cash flow positive in a relatively short time. In other words, it
is the lender, and not the Bankruptcy Code or the bankruptcy judge, that is
deciding how long the managers will have to make a go of things.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
181
THOMAS H. JACKSON, THE LOGIC AND LIMITS OF BANKRUPTCY LAW 218-24
(1986); Douglas G. Baird, The Uneasy Case for Corporate Reorganizations, 15 J. LEGAL
STUD. 127 (1986); Michael Bradley & Michael Rosenzweig, The Untenable Case for
Chapter II, 101 YALE L.J. 1043 (1992); Robert K. Rasmussen, Debtor~ Choice: A Menu
Approach to Corporate Bankruptcy, 71 TEX. L. REv. 51 (1992); Lynn M. LoPucki,
Chapter JI.' An Agenda for Basic Reform, 69 AM. BANKR. L.J. 573 (1995); see also
Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Chapter I J, in 1 NEW pALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND
THE LAW 219, 221-22 (1998).
182
See generally Baird & Rasmussen, End ofBankruptcy, supra note 139; Douglas
G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen, Chapter JI at Twilight, 56 STAN. L. REv. 673 (2003).
But see Lynn M. LoPucki, The Nature of the Bankrupt Firm: A Response to Baird and
Rasmussen's The End of Bankruptcy, 56 STAN. L. REv. 645 (2003) [hereinafter, The
Nature] (offering empirical evidence to refute Baird and Rasmussen's claim that chapter
11 has become obsolete as a means for firms to reorganize).
ID
.
Baird & Rasmussen, End ofBankruptcy, supra note 139, at 773.
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given that control rights are commonly vested by contract in the hands of
a dominant lender. 184 This lender is functionally the residual owner of the
firm and therefore its interests are perfectly aligned with those of the
enterprise. 185 Finally, they asserted that the market for distressed firms
has become more sophisticated so that court supervised reorganizations
are not only unnecessary, but irrelevant. 186 Firms that have continued
viability can be more efficiently sold than rehabilitated. 187
The development of theoretical alternatives to chapter 11 's messy,
multi-party, negotiated process have gained momentum largely because
of the supposed inefficiencies in the current system and because of the
perceived inequities inherent in the compromise of secured creditors'
property interests. 188 Revised Article 9, with its facilitation of the encum
brance of all of a debtor's assets, may result in striking changes in the
operation of chapter 11, toward a "secured-party-in-control" model. 189 It
remains to be proven through empirical study whether Article 9's
revision has dictated this direction of bankruptcy policy.

B. The Value ofReorganization
There are scholars, however, who challenge the "control rights
account of modem chapter 11 practice." 190 Moreover, our current
judicially supervised business bankruptcy system continues to have its
champions. 191 These scholars recognize chapter 11 as imperfect but, with
some adjustment, still capable of embracing positive normative
objectives beyond the repayment of a single controlling creditor. 192
Chapter 11 not only allows for the enhancement of creditor welfare but is
184

Id. at 778.
Id. at 786.
186 Id.
187
Id. at 784.
188 Id.
189
Elizabeth Warren & Jay L. Westbrook, Secured Party in Possession, AM. BANKR.
INST. J., Sept. 2003, at 12.
190
Stephen J. Lubben, The "New and Improved" Chapter 11, 93 KY. L.J. 839, 848
(2005).
191
LoPucki, The Nature, supra note 182. This study was conducted using Professor
LoPucki's database of public companies who have filed for bankruptcy. See generally
Lynn M. LoPucki's Bankruptcy Research Database, available at http://lopucki.law.
ucla.edu (last visited Mar. 14, 2004). Teresa A. Sullivan et. al., The Use of Empirical
Data in Formulating Bankruptcy Policy, 50 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 195, 196
(observing that "empirical research is vitally needed in the formation of bankruptcy
policy'').
192
Elizabeth Warren & Jay L. Westbrook, Contracting Out of Bankruptcy: An
Empirical Intervention, 118 HARV. L. REv. 1197 (2005) [hereinafter Contracting Out of
Bankruptcy] (setting forth empirical data demonstrating that a debtor in bankruptcy
negotiates myriad economic as well as non-contractual obligations).
185
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also capable of facilitating the preservation of a debtor's going concern
value. 1§3
Chapter 11 also provides a structure that makes apparent the central
role an insolvent firm may play in a micro- or macro-economy. 194 A
multitude of parties beyond traditional debt and equity holders have an
interest in a firm at the time of its insolvency, including employees,
suppliers, customers, and members of the firm's greater community. 195
This perspective rejects the narrow view that the sole policy objective of
bankruptcy law is to maximize the recovery of a dominant party or
parties holding formalized claims. 196
In response to the scholars decrying the obsolescence of chapter 11,
Professor Lynn LoPucki offers both reason and empirical evidence as
proof that chapter 11 continues to have a function and a purpose. 197 He
first refutes the claim that going concern value is an anachronistic
notion. 198 He identifies "going concern value" not only as the value that a
group of assets, functioning as a unit, will generate in the future, but also
as the value embodied in the relationship between a firm and its fungible
assets, and finally as the value in the full range of the know-how and
expertise possessed by the firm's high-level and low-level workers. 199
The very real value that results from these relationships would not
survive a market sale. 200
Second, LoPucki challenges the notion that there is a universal
contract capable of placing a single residual owner of a firm in control

According to adherents to this approach, chapter V, given its inherent flexibility,
continues to have "unrecognized" and "underemphasized virtues." William C. Whitford,
What's Right About Chapter Jl, 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 1379, 1381 (1994).
194
Moreover, in addition to its powers to preserve going concern value, chapter 11
has the additional virtue of inherent flexibility. Chapter 11 offers the possibility, in
appropriate circumstances, of creatively managing some of a viable debtor's more
crippling obligations. Such obligations may include both tort claims and untenable
capital structures. Bankruptcy allows for the adjustment of a firm's capital structure so
that it can resume its operation as a going concern. There is a distinction to be made
between financial distress and economic distress. Economic distress comes about when
a firm fails to be successful in the marketplace. A firm is in financial distress when it is
unable to pay its creditors. JACKSON, supra note 181, at 4 ("A business is in financial
distress when its own 'internal mechanisms for adaptation to actual or anticipated'
demands of parties with an interest in the business are 'impaired."').
195
See generally KAREN GROSS, FAILURE AND FORGIVENESS: REBALANCING THE
BANKRUPTCY SYSTEM 248-49 (1997); Donald R. Korobkin, Rehabilitating Values: A
Jurisprudence of Bankruptcy, 91 CoLUM. L. REv. 717, 763 (1991).
196
SARRA, supra note 177, at 47.
197
LoPucki, The Nature, supra note 182.
198
Id. at 651-53.
199
Id. at 652, 654-55.
200
See generally
193
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during the insolvency proceeding. 201 He argues that a firm's residual
interest is often held more broadly and investors with different priorities
promote interests that conflict with each other and those of the firm. 202
Chapter 11 's reorganization system allows a board of directors,
constrained by their fiduciary obligations to all parties-in-interest and
under the supervision of a bankruptcy judge, to reconcile these
conflicts. 203 Reorganization's "continued vitality" supports this claim.204
Finally, while the market for the sale of distressed firms has
developed in recent years, the growing number of reorganizations belies
the claim that the chapter 11 system is obsolete. 205 After citing potential
reasons, in addition to the presence of "going-concern value," for boards
of directors to opt for reorganization, LoPucki concludes by observing
that many firms resist liquidations and noting that the complex reasons
for this resistance are ripe for further study. 206
In similarly recognizing the value of public, judicial control of the
reorganization process, Professor Westbrook observes in a recent article
that if there is a universal contract that places a single residual owner of a
firm in "control" during a bankruptcy, as asserted by the "contract
ualists," it is a dominant secured creditor. 207 Contending that the secured
credit system is central to the discussion of "control" of a business
debtor's bankruptcy, Westbrook observes that there is a direct relation
ship between "contractualism and a dominant security interest."208 He
argues that if the "contractualists" are correct in asserting that business
bankruptcy has moved from a multi-party negotiated process to a control
model, secured credit law is the "necessary and singular stronghold of
the ... privatization of [business bankruptcy] because a security interest
provides the institutional mechanism for control of that process."209
The revisions made to Article 9 may provide support for the theory
that business bankruptcies are now controlled by a single party.
Alternatively, it may be the case that this position is overstated-not
201

Id. at 661. "The residual owner of a firm is the investor who will reap the
marginal dollar of gain or suffer the marginal dollar of loss from the firm's activities. If
such an investor exists, it is the perfect person to control the firm. Its interests and the
firm's interest are identical." Id. (footnotes omitted).
202
Id. at 662.
203
Id. at 665.
204
Id. at 664--65.
205
Id. at 670.
206
Id. at 667-69 (describing how a firm's sale upsets implicit agreements between
the original board of directors, shareholders, creditors, and other interested parties
agreernents that often prompted each party to make its respective financial, contractual,
or societal commitment with the firm in the first place).
207
Westbrook, The Control of Wealth, supra note 137, at 798.
20s Id.
209 Id.

902

KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL

[VOL. 93

borne out by the evidence of how the statute is working in practice. If the
contract theorists are correct and one dominant party, the secured
creditor, controls the bankruptcy process, two unaddressed issues remain:
the unproven efficiency of secured credit and the dominant secured
party's bias in controlling a reorganization that has an impact on third
parties and on the debtor as an enterprise. 210
1. The Worst Case - Article 9 's Impact in Bankruptcy

a. Debtor-in-Bankruptcy's Cash Flow
If one sees virtue in the continued availability of a judicially
supervised business reorganization system, revisions made to Article 9
raise compelling concerns. Fundamentally, these revisions may increase
both the circumstances in which a dominant secured creditor has control
of a debtor's business reorganization and the scope of that control.
To illustrate, myriad provisions in Revised Article 9 facilitate the
encumbrance of the debtor-in-possession's cash.2 11 The Bankruptcy
Code designates encumbered cash as "cash collateral"212 and, because the
risk of dissipation or loss is greater with cash than with less liquid assets,
there are specific limitations on its use by the estate.213 For example, a
debtor-in-possession must segregate and account for any cash collateral
in its possession, custody, or control. 214 Moreover, cash collateral may
not be used without either the secured creditor's or the bankruptcy
,
.
. •
215
court s pnor perm1ss10n.
There is, however, a correspondingly greater need by the debtor-in
possession for cash than for other types of unencumbered assets.2 16 This
210

Id. at 838-53.
11 U.S.C. § 1107(a) (2000). In many reorganizations, the debtor-in-possession
is granted the power and authority of the trustee in bankruptcy and is charged with the
responsibility of administering the estate for the benefit of the debtor's creditors. Id.
212
As defined by the Bankruptcy Code, cash collateral includes "cash, negotiable
instruments, documents of title, securities, deposit accounts, or other cash equivalents
whenever acquired in which the estate and an entity other than the estate have an
interest ...." I I U.S.C. § 363(a) (2000).
213
§ 363(c)(2)-(4).
214
§ 363(c)(2).
215
§ 363(c)(4).
216
In re Greenwood Bldg. Supply, Inc., 23 B.R. 720, 721 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1982)
(noting that without cash collateral a debtor could not reorganize); Sun-Bank/Suncoast
v. Earth Lite, Inc. (In re Earth Lite, Inc.), 9 B.R. 440, 443 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1981)
(noting that "few, if any" debtors could successfully reorganize without cash collateral);
In re Rancourt, 123 B.R. 143 (Bankr. D. N.H. 1991) (recognizing the necessity of a
debtor's use of cash collateral rents in the first months following a bankruptcy in order
to conduct its business during the reorganization effort); In re Dynaco Corp., 162 B.R.
389, 393 (Bankr. D. N.H. 1993) (same).
211
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need comes from the financial demands of employees, suppliers, and
others who are working for and with the debtor-in-possession as it
attempts to reorganize. 217
An example of how Article 9 facilitates the encumbrance of a
debtor's cash flow is found in its inclusion of commercial deposit
accounts as original collateral.218 Banks hold substantial business
deposits and provide a significant portion of business credit. 219 Now that
deposit accounts may be encumbered as original collateral, the cash in
such accounts is more likely to be encumbered. If the account is
encumbered, then it is not simply cash upon a debtor's bankruptcy but
rather "cash collateral."220 As such, the debtor must get either the secured
creditor's or the court's permission to use the cash in the account. If such
permission is granted by a court, "adequate protection" of the secured
creditor's interest must be provided, 221 which requires the use of other
unencumbered assets. 222 Because of the ease with which secured
creditors can obtain a blanket lien on all of a debtor's assets, 223 it is much
less likely that there will be any unencumbered assets for adequate
protection and thus less likely that a court could grant permission for a
debtor-in-possession to use its cash collateral.
In a related manner, the expanded definition of proceeds may result
in less unencumbered cash with which to reorganize. 224 Since the new
definition of proceeds includes a wider range of assets generated by the
original collateral, there is an increased chance that the debtor will have
"cash collateral" rather than unencumbered cash in its deposit
accounts. 225 For example, if royalties from the licensing of intellectual
property are deposited into a debtor's bank account prior to a bankruptcy
217

Jean Braucher, Bankruptcy Reorganization and Economic Development, 23 CAP.
U. L REv. 499, 500--01 (1994) (describing chapter 11 as a "prelude to liquidation since
most chapter 11 cases fail," but also positing that even a failed chapter 11 may be
considered a proceeding that "gets a business in the bankruptcy system, subject to the
scrutiny of a judge and of creditors and usually headed toward an orderly liquidation");
see also Reconstruction Fin. Corp. v. Kaplan (/n re Waltham Watch Co.), 185 F.2d 791
(I st Cir. 1950).
218
See discussion infra Part ILA. I .d.
219
Markell, supra note 59, at 975.
220
11 U.S.C. § 362 (automatic stay); § 363 (defines and limits trustee's powers to
dispose of estate property); § 364 (governs trustee's ability to obtain credit and incur
debt on behalf of the estate).
221
§ 361 (providing that a secured creditor is entitled to the "value" of its security
interest, providing a non-exhaustive list of adequate protection of this entitlement, and
permitting the court to order a collateral substitute or some other interest that is the
"indubitable equivalent").
222 Id.
223
See supra notes 113-114 and accompanying text.
224
See supra notes 67-74 and accompanying text.
225
See supra notes 211-213 and accompanying
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filing, such funds will become the "cash collateral" of the creditor
holding a security interest in the intellectual property as original
collateral. Accordingly, these funds are available to the bankruptcy estate
only after court (or creditor) approval. 226
b. Procedural Modifications

The Revised Article 9 procedural modifications also have the
potential to be more pronounced in bankruptcy. Many of Revised Article
9's two-tier perfection rules, including the diluted financing statement
information requirements applicable when a security interest is chal
lenged by the bankruptcy trustee, may have the effect of subverting the
trustee's strong arm. 227 The trustee's strong-arm power has historically
been exercised to "free up [certain] assets [in bankruptcy], that could not
be reached ... outside of bankruptcy."228 The new two-tier perfection
rules have the opposite effect. They allow for the perfection of security
interests in certain assets in bankruptcy that would likely be deemed
unperfected and thus unencumbered under state law. 229
c. Expansion ofProceeds in Bankruptcy

When a debtor files for bankruptcy, the expanded definition of
proceeds impacts debtors and other creditors in ways it does not outside
of bankruptcy. In bankruptcy, creditors are paid from the assets that are
included in the debtor's bankruptcy estate. A bankruptcy estate is
automatically created upon a debtor's bankruptcy filing and includes "all
legal or equitable interests of the debtor in property as of the
226

11 U.S.C. § 363(c)(2)(A)-(B). In addition, secured creditors with a claim to
proceeds deposited in commingled accounts will no longer be limited to proceeds
received within ten days of bankruptcy. Equitable tracing principles, such as the "lowest
intermediate balance rule," are an expressly recognized way of determining which
commingled assets are identifiable proceeds of the creditor's original collateral. Former
section 9-306(4)(d) limited creditors' claims to proceeds in commingled accounts to
those proceeds received within ten days of the filing of the bankruptcy petition. U.C.C.
§ 9-306(4)(d) (1995). See U.C.C. § 9-315 cmt. 3 (2001) (permitting any means of tracing
allowed by other law when identifying proceeds in commingled account).
227
11 U.S.C. § 544(a)-(b) (2000); see also Pryor, supra note 20, at 245. See
discussion infra Part II.B.3 on Revised Article 9's two-tier perfection rules.
228
Warner, supra note I 0, at 27.
229
Elizabeth Warren, Bankruptcy Policy, 54 U. CHI. L. R.Ev. 775, 809 (1987)
[hereinafter Bankruptcy Policy] (observing that given the difficulty many secured
creditors have realizing the value of their collateral upon a debtor's default, many may
prefer the one-forum benefits offered by the bankruptcy system); Warner, supra note
I0, at 31 ("[T]he priority of secured credit[ ors] should not be recognized in bankruptcy
unless the notice oflien [is] meaningful notice.").
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commencement of the case,'mo "wherever located and by whomever
held."231 The bankruptcy estate also includes "[p]roceeds, product,
offspring, rents, or profits of or from property of the estate. " 232
The Bankruptcy Code makes a sharp distinction between "proceeds"
of collateral and other after-acquired collateral. Section 552 of the
Bankruptcy Code recognizes security interests in proceeds of pre
petition collateral, but does not recognize security interests in assets
acquired by the debtor post-petition that are not deemed to be
proceeds. 233 The interesting and difficult question is whether the expan
sion of the Article 9 definition of "proceeds" will expand the meaning of
the term "proceeds" under the Bankruptcy Code. 234
Currently, the courts are split as to the proper interpretation of the
term "proceeds" under § 541 and § 552 of the Bankruptcy Code. Some
courts have used a liberal federal bankruptcy law definition that em
phasizes the rehabilitative purpose of bankruptcy law. 235 Others have
applied former Article 9's definition. 236 Still others rely on the legislative
history of § 552 to create a definition of proceeds that is more liberal
than former Article 9's. 237 If Revised Article 9's broad definition of
proceeds is adopted by bankruptcy courts, what was after-acquired
property will become proceeds, and, accordingly, there will be a greater
number of encumbered assets in a debtor's bankruptcy estate and a
230

11 U.S.C. § 54l(a)(l) (2005).
§ 54l(a); see also CHARLES JORDAN TABB, THE LAW OF BANKRUPTCY 274-81
(1997). Property subject to security interests (collateral) is included in the estate, is
subject to the automatic stay and turnover orders, and may be used by the debtor in
furtherance of its reorganization if deemed necessary for the reorganization to be
effective. If the court deems collateral necessary for an effective reorganization, the
secured creditor is granted adequate protection, but any motion to lift the automatic stay
will be denied. Contrast this with property the debtor has sold in connection with a
securitization, which is generally not included in the estate-<me reason securitization
attracts investors. 11 U.S.C. §§ 361, 364(d), 541 (2000).
232
TABB, supra note 231, at 284-85.
233
11 U.S.C. § 552(a)--{b).
234
See generally WARD, supra note 71, at§§ 4:57-4:59.
235
Casey v. Hochman, 963 F.2d 1347, 1350 (10th Cir. 1992) (suggesting that the
concept of proceeds in bankruptcy under section 54l(a)(6) is broader than the Article 9
conception).
236
See Fed. Deposit Ins. v. Hastie (In re Hastie), 2 F.3d 1042, 1045-47 (10th Cir.
1993) (stating a security interest in stock dividends was not perfected because the
dividends were not received in exchange of stock that was disposed of, as per § 9
306(4)); Bumper Sales, Inc. v. Marepcon Fin. Corp (In re Bumper Sales, Inc.), 907 F.2d
1430, 1437 (4th Cir. 1990) (holding Article 9's definition of"proceeds" established the
scope of Bankruptcy Code § 552(b)); J. Catton Farms, Inc. v. First Nat'! Bank of
Chicago (In re J. Cotton Farms, Inc.), 779 F.2d 1242 (7th Cir. 1985) (a security interest
in receivables and accounts extended to a payment received post-petition).
237
S. REP. No. 95-989 at 82, 83 (1978) (stating the term "proceeds" is not limited to
the technical definition of that term in the UCC); H. REP. No. 95-595 at 368 (1977).
231
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correspondingly smaller number of unencumbered assets available for
the debtors' residual claimants. Secured creditors may now be able to
assert a § 552(b) secured claim to, for example, license fees, derivative
works of a copyright, patent infringement claims, and post-petition
rental fees. 238
d. Securitization in Bankruptcy

The changes in Article 9 designed to facilitate securitization
transactions present a somewhat different issue.239 As described above,
when a debtor engages in a securitization, it sells its cash flow to third
party investors. 240 Once sold, the cash flow is no longer part of the
debtor's bankruptcy estate,241 even though it may have been the only
238

11 U.S.C. § 552(b)(l}--(2) (2000). There is, however, a possible limitation on
the impact of this Article 9 change in bankruptcy. Though § 552(b)(l) recognizes the
secured creditor's lien on post-petition assets, including proceeds from pre-petition
collateral (if applicable non-bankruptcy law and the security agreement so provide), it
also permits the bankruptcy court, "after notice and a hearing and based on the equities
of the case, [to order] otherwise." § 552(b)(l) & (2). This § 552(b) exception was
intended to strike "an appropriate balance between the rights of secured creditors and
the rehabilitative purposes of the Bankruptcy Code." United Va. Bank v. Slab Fork Coal
Co. (In re Slab Fork Coal Co.), 784 F.2d 1188, 1191 (4th Cir. 1986). This exception is
typically applied only to business reorganizations under chapter 11 where the secured
party is oversecured and will come by a windfall "from collateral that has appreciated in
value as a result of the trustee's/debtors-in-possession's use of other assets of the estate
(which would normally go to general creditors) to cause the appreciated value."
Delbridge v. Prod. Credit Assoc., 104 B.R. 824, 826 (E.D. Mich. 1989); see also Jn re J.
Catton Farms, Inc., 779 F.2d at 1247 (discussing § 552(b)'s equitable exception); In re
Patio & Porch Sys., Inc., 194 B.R. 569, 575 (Bankr. D. Md. 1996) (same); Airport Inn
Assocs., Ltd. v. Travelers Ins. (In re Airport Inn Assocs., Ltd.), 132 B.R. 951, 959
(Bankr. D. Colo. 1990) (same); Wilke Truck Serv. v. Wiegmann (Jn re Wiegmann), 95
B.R. 90 (Bankr. S.D. Ill. 1989) (same).
·
239
Lois R. Lupica, Circumvention of the Bankruptcy Process: The Statutory
Institutionalization ofSecuritization, 33 CONN. L. REv. 199, 200 (2000); Lois R. Lupica,
Revised Article 9, Securitization Transactions and the Bankruptcy Dynamic, 9 AM.
BANKR. lNST. L. REV. 287, 314 (2001) [hereinafter Bankruptcy Dynamic].
240
See supra notes 86-89 and accompanying text.
241
Worcester County Nat'! Bank v. Xinde Int'! Inc. (In re Xinde Int'! Inc.), 13 B.R.
212, 215 (Ballkr. D. Mass. 1981) (cautioning courts to "balance the needs of the
creditor's protection against the debtor's likelihood of a successful rehabilitation" so
that adequate protection requirements do not foreclose a debtor's opportunity to
reorganize). While bankruptcy law respects non-bankruptcy property interests,
including security interests, secured creditors are entitled in bankruptcy to receive only
the value of their collateral, not the collateral itself. A secured creditor may merely be
offered "adequate protection" in the form of substitute collateral or some other interest
that is the "indubitable equivalent." 11 U.S.C. § 361 (1997). The Supreme Court has
recognized that secured creditors' property interest in their collateral continues,
notwithstanding debtor's bankruptcy. United States v. Sec. Indus. Bank, 459 U.S. 70
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cash or cash equivalent available to pay trade creditors, employees,
consumer claims, and other unsecured creditors during the pendency of
242
the bankruptcy proceeding. In the absence of cash flow, there will
likely be a dearth of cash collateral as well as unencumbered cash.2 43 Not
only will unsecured creditors of a securitizing originator be harmed by
the increased chance of business liquidation, even in cases where the
debtor is worth "more alive than dead," but repayment to unsecured
creditors in bankruptcy may be smaller if a debtor securitizes all or a
portion of its liquid assets than it would be if the originator offered its
liquid assets as collateral for a loan. 244 "Viewed through the lens of
control,"245 securitization permits a party to take the economic equivalent
of a security interest, yet opt out of its debtor's bankruptcy-leaving in
its wake a compromised chance of the debtor's reorganization.
VI. PROPOSED AGENDA FOR RESEARCH - THE INITIAL STUDY

A. The Objectives ofEmpiricism
The objective of any empirical research study is to create a higher
level of confidence in resulting conclusions than is possible by
prediction, opinion, or reason alone. A study of the market for credit
must build upon the work of others-theorists and empiricists alike. 246
Drawing on the work of Hill and Mann we have learned, to date, that
there are many segments of the market for secured debt. 247 Accordingly,
each market must be studied individually, and each study must target a
particular market segment.
(1982); see also H.R. REP. No. 595, 95-595 (1977); II U.S.C. §§ 361, 363(f)(3),
l 129(b)(2)(B) (1997).
242
See supra note 136 and accompanying text.
243
See l l U.S.C. § 726 (2000); Lupica, Bankruptcy Dynamic, supra note 239, at
290. According to the Bankruptcy Code's priority scheme, secured creditors are paid the
value of their collateral first, before any distribution can be made to any other party.
Unsecured creditors share in a pro rata distribution of assets that remain after secured
creditors, administrative expenses, and priority claims are paid. See 11 U.S.C. § 507
(setting forth the Bankruptcy Code's priority scheme). As the secured creditors encum
ber more assets, fewer assets are available to any other party with an interest or claim.
244
See Lupica, Asset Securitization, supra note 91, at 618-35; Lupica, Circum
vention, supra note 239, at 232--40.
245
Jay L. Westbrook, Bankruptcy Control ofthe Recovery Process, 12 AM. BANKR.
INST. L. REv. 245, 256 (2004).
246
There are a variety of funding sources potentially available to finance such a
study. See, e.g., American Bankruptcy Institute Endowment, athttp://www.abiworld.org;
National Conference of Bankruptcy Judges Educational Endowment, at http://www.ncbj.
org.
247
See Hill, supra note 157; Mann, Strategy and Force, supra note 157; Mann,
Explaining the Pattern, supra note 157.
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As noted above, one of the enduring questions in the theoretical
scholarship on Article 9 is whether secured debt is efficient or whether it
enables firms to externalize liabilities on non-adjusting third-party
creditors. The enactment of Revised Article 9 raises questions regarding
the practical effects of the statute's expanded scope and procedural
modifications, and the impact, if any, on borrowers' third-party creditors
and on the bankruptcy process. Moreover, the tentative hypothesis that
borrower repayment can be attributed to strategic pressure exhibited by
lenders at various points in the lending relationship must also be studied
empirically.
The specific questions that will frame the hypotheses to be tested
include:
i) Have secured creditors extended more credit to debtors since the
. Article 9 rule changes? If so, have secured creditors extended secured
credit because of the new Article 9 rules? To what extent has Revised
Article 9 influenced secured creditors' credit-extension decision
making?
ii) Have secured creditors been more inclined to encumber collateral
since Revised Article 9's enactment? If so, to what extent? Is there an
increased incidence of creditors taking "blanket liens?"
iii) If more assets have been typically encumbered as a consequence of
Article 9's revision, how have trade creditors adapted? Are trade
creditors responding any differently under Revised Article 9 than they
did under the former rules? Are they requiring cash upon delivery of
goods? Are they more likely to take purchase-money security interests?
iv) Have trade creditors benefited from long-term relationships with
debtors? Has the presence of dominant secured creditors increased or
decreased the incidence of prompt repayment?
v) What factors influence the decision to lend on a secured basis? On an
unsecured basis?
vi) What percentage of loans made were repaid in full? What percentage
ofloans made were repaid without resort to Article 9 remedies (collateral
repossession)? What is your institution's policy for responding to
information that borrower repayment is threatened?
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Based upon the foregoing issues, both qualitative and quantitative
work must be done, especially as it relates to small business. To that end,
I propose the design of an initial study in three parts.
B. Research Protocol - A Study in Three Parts

1. Information Gathered by Interviews
The first part of the study would be a series of telephone and in
person interviews of commercial lawyers and credit providers. With the
cooperation of several states' bar associations, interviews would be
conducted with a random sample of attorneys who are members of their
bar association's commercial law sections.248 Also, the AllRegs' Lender
Directory, a database of 20,000 lending institutions, and the Small
Business Administration directory of lenders would be used to generate a
random sample of various credit providers. 249 Interviews would be
similarly conducted with providers from this random sample.
The information gleaned from these interviews would be analyzed in
light of the information gathered from the database and the survey
questionnaires. 250 The interview component of the study, however, would
have as its primary objective an analysis of the attitudes and information
about the secured credit process. The interview portion of the survey
would focus on the issue of leverage and power in the credit relationship
and would also seek to confirm the discoveries in the quantitative portion
of the study.
2. Information Gathered by Survey
A survey of creditors and creditors' attorneys working in a specific
geographic region would be similarly conducted. Survey subjects would
248

States with integrated bar associations will be identified. An integrated bar
association is one to which every lawyer must earn membership prior to practicing in that
state. Each survey recipient will be sent three items: 1) a letter of introduction describing
the study and urging their participation, 2) the survey itself-with a deadline for
completion, and 3) a postcard reminding them to return the survey, sent after the
deadline. Because each survey will be anonymous, it will not be possible to determine
who did and did not return the survey.
249
AllRegs' Lender Directory is a database of lending institutions. It includes more
than 20,000 lenders, servicers, institutional investors, and financial entities of all types,
including credit unions. AllRegs' Lender Directory, available at http://www.allregs
.corn/products/lender/default.asp. The Small Business Association also maintains a
database of small business lenders. U.S. Small Business Administration, SBA Certified
and Preferred Lenders, available at http://www.sba.gov/gopher/Local-Information/
Certified-Preferred-Lenders/.
250
See infra Part VI.A.2 describing survey questionnaires.
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be selected in the same way interview respondents were selected. The
survey would include dichotomous questions251 and questions that
attempt to measure on an interval level, 252 both of which are ultimately
susceptible to quantitative analysis. Findings from the analysis of survey
responses would be used to develop the framework for the quantitative
component of the study.
3. Data from the Survey ofSmall Business Finances
There is excellent publicly available data concerning the financial
practices of small business borrowers. The Federal Reserve Bank, in
cooperation with the United States Small Business Administration,
conducts a study of small business borrowers every five years. Known as
the Survey of Small Business Finances ("SSBF"), 253 this study collects
data concerning roughly 4000 small business borrowers, which are
defined as firms having fewer than 500 employees. 254 The database
includes information about loans applied for and granted to the target
businesses, as well as the extent to which they were collateralized. 255 The
source of credit is divided between bank loans, 256 non-bank financiers, 257

251

A dichotomous question is one with two possible responses (i.e., yes or no). See
William M.K. Trochim, Types ofQuestions, at http://www.socialresearchmethods.net/kb/
ques1{Ee.htm (Apr. 2, 2005).
The most common types of interval level questions ask the respondent to respond
to a question on a 1-5 rating scale, with "I" meaning "strongly disagree" and "5"
meaning "strongly agree." Id.
253
This was formerly known as the National Survey of Small Business Finances
("NSSBF").
254
The 1998 data can be accessed at Federal Reserve Board, Survey of Small
Business Finances, available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/oss/oss3/ssbf98/ssbf
98home.html (last visited Mar. 14, 2005). This database is publicly available and includes
information about borrowers, coded by organizational form (S-corporations, C
corporations, LLCs, or partnerships), whether the business is family owned, the education
level of the firm owner, whether the firm is in a service business, whether the firm is
rated as "significant risk" or "high risk" by Dun & Bradstreet, and whether the firm had
bad credit. "Bad credit" exists if the firm or its principal owner declared bankruptcy
within the past seven years, the principal owner was delinquent on personal obligations
within the past three years, the firm was delinquent on business obligations within the
past three years, or judgments were rendered against the owner within the past three
years. Id.
255
See id.
256
Bank loans include loans from commercial banks, savings banks, and savings and
loans. See id.
257
Non-bank financial sources include loans from credit unions, finance companies,
insurance companies, brokerage or mutual fund companies, leasing companies, mortgage
companies, and venture capitalists. See id.
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and non-bank, non-financial sources. 258 The 1998 database is currently
available, and the 2003 database is expected to be released in June
2004. 259 These data reflect the behavior of small business borrowers
under the former Article 9 regime. The 2008 data (expected to be
released in 2009) will reflect the behavior of borrowers operating under
the Revised Article 9 rules. 260
These data would be analyzed to determine the relative incidence of
secured and unsecured credit among borrowers surveyed. Borrowers'
credit risk would be correlated with the type of borrowing engaged in
(secured or unsecured), as well as with the type oflender.
VII.

THE SECOND

STUDY -ARTICLE 9 DEBTORS IN BANKRUPTCY

To objectively understand the impact of Revised Article 9, the statute
must also be studied in the context of a business debtor's bankruptcy.
Business debtors that access the bankruptcy system, for purposes of a
study, can be divided into small companies (less than 500 employees),
large but privately held companies, and public companies.
Building upon the work done as part of the Business Bankruptcy
Project,261 the same questions set forth in Part VI above-what are the
practical effects of Article 9's expanded scope and procedural modi
fications, and the impact, if any, on third party creditors of borrowers
must be asked in the context of bankruptcy. In addition, further questions
arise concerning the recovery of general creditors with and without
dominant secured creditors. A further issue for study will be the extent to
which the bankruptcy process was controlled by a single party, and the
nature of that party (ex ante creditor, ex post lender).
A random sample of small business debtors' bankruptcy files from
several districts would be examined to identify both the nature of the
collateral taken by the original, pre-bankruptcy lender and the type of
collateral being offered to the debtor-in-possession lender. Files of
debtors who declared bankruptcy when their financing arrangements
were governed by former Article 9 would be examined and compared
258

Non-bank, non-financial sources include loans from other business firms,
families or individuals, government agencies, supplier loans, credit cards, check clearing,
factoring, loans from the owner herself, and loans from a retirement account. See Federal
Reserve Board, Survey of Small Business Finances, available at http://www.federal
reserve.gov/pubs/oss/oss3/ssbf98/ssbf98home.html (last visited Mar. 14, 2005).
259
Telephone Interview with John Wolken, Senior Economist and Principal
Investigator, Federal Reserve Board (Feb. 23, 2004).
260 Id.
261
Warren & Westbrook, Contracting Out ofBankruptcy, supra note 192; Elizabeth
Warren & Jay L. Westbrook, Financial Characteristics ofBusiness Bankruptcy, 73 AM.
BANKR. L.J. 499 (1999).
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with files of debtors who filed for bankruptcy following Revised Article
9's enactment. The results of such a study would be controlled to prove
or disprove a causal relationship between Revised Article 9's expanded
scope and any identified effects in bankruptcy. The practical implications
of such a study, however, would be dictated by one's normative
perspective on the function and purpose of business bankruptcy.
VIII. CONCLUSION

Revised Article 9 has redefined the contours of the relationship
between secured creditors, unsecured creditors, and debtors by granting
secured creditors greater rights than they had under former Article 9.
These revisions were made at a time when there was neither consensus as
to secured credit's theoretical justification nor empirical evidence to
support any of the theories justifying or criticizing the unqualified use of
secured credit. In the absence of empirical evidence, in a world of
conflicting theories it is difficult to defend legal reforms that encourage a
further expansion of the secured credit system.
Moreover, the revision of Article 9 may have dictated the future
course of the bankruptcy system without resolving the normative debate
on the function and purpose of business bankruptcy. When viewed
through the lens of bankruptcy, with its focus on satisfying the interests
of the collective, Article 9's distributive scheme raises compelling
concerns. As a result of the Article 9 revisions, when a debtor files for
bankruptcy, assets that are inadvertently encumbered,262 assets acquired
post-petition, assets described in flawed documentation, and the debtor's
cash flow, are all diverted from unsecured to secured creditors to a far
greater degree than was the case under former Article 9.
The question whether the Revised Article 9 rules are inconsistent
with or adverse to bankruptcy policy was raised by scholars commenting
on the final version of Revised Article 9. 263 One response was that the
question was "incoherent" because "allocating property rights (such as
priorities) cannot conflict with bankruptcy policies. " 264 Adhering to that
logic, Article 9 could have been revised to allow secured creditors to take
secret liens in every conceivable type of property2 65 without even a nod
262

My Point is not that unsecured creditors under former Article 9 relied on sloppy
commercial lawyering to receive their "fair share" of the debtor's assets in bankruptcy,
but rather that new Article 9's "pass" for secured creditors who do not comply with the
basic formalities of the attachment and perfection procedure has the potential to
redistribute wealth from unsecured to secured creditors.
263
Harris & Mooney, Policy & Impact, supra note 7, at 94.
264 Id.
265
See Warren, Imperfect Information, supra note 21, at 1386 (suggesting (though
not requesting the drafters to get any "new ideas") that security interests in body parts

2004-2005]

THE IMPACT OF REVISED ARTICLE 9

913

to any other third party's (or even the debtor's) interests and still have
been perfectly consistent with bankruptcy policy. As long as bargains
between the debtor and its creditors were consensual with the limits of
that bargain defined by state law, then bankruptcy, in deference to state
law rules, would simply be a process for administering that allocational
bargain from an inadequate resource pool. Secured creditors would get
everything and control the process and unsecured creditors would be left
with nothing. Moreover, all bankruptcies would be swift liquidations,
notwithstanding the presence of a going concern value, because there
would be no resources to use in reorganization. The question how might
Article 9 potentially affect bankruptcy and the range of interests implicit
in bankruptcy is not only coherent but incalculably important.
Without the results of an empirical study, it is impossible to estimate
what the actual effects of the revision will be either in or out of
bankruptcy. There remain many unanswered questions. An empirical
study of Revised Article 9's impact will add much to the debate
concerning the impact and the wisdom of secured credit.

would allow certain parties to get either credit they otherwise could not obtain or more
favorable credit terms, and that the threat of foreclosure (on a cornea!) would provide a
strong incentive for repayment). "Revised Article 9 is not an amendment so much as a
reconfiguration of current law." Corrine Cooper, Preface to THE NEW ARTICLE 9
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE (Corrine Cooper ed., 2d ed. 2000); see also Melissa M.
Perry, Comment, Fragmented Bodies, Legal Privilege, and Commodification in Science
and Medicine, 51 ME. L. REv. 169 (1999).

